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JURISDICTION
For the reasons stated below and for the reasons outlined in BV Jordanelle, LLC's
("BV Jordanelle") Suggestion ofMootness filed with the Court on January 15, 2010, the
Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this appeal, and this appeal is moot. Should
the Court disagree with BV Jordanelle's arguments regarding jurisdiction, this Court
could review Judge Pullan's decision pursuant to its jurisdiction over final judgments and
orders of the district courts. See Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)0) (2008).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1.

Whether the Court has jurisdiction to entertain this appeal on the merits

where The Highlands at Jordanelle, LLC ("The Highlands") failed to name in its
Complaint or anywhere in the case below the beneficiary under the Trust Deed securing
the property sought to be condemned, and where that interest was subsequently
foreclosed and transferred to a third-party—BV Jordanelle—that was only added to the
case after the entry of final judgment.
2.

Whether the underlying action was filed prematurely where The Highlands

failed to provide PWJ Holdings, LLC ("PWJ"), the original landowner of the real
property in question, with the name and telephone number of the property rights
ombudsman prior to filing its Complaint and where the "public road" that The Highlands
seeks to access by condemning private property for an easement has not even been
constructed and may never be constructed.
3.

Whether the trial court properly denied The Highlands' motion for entry of

default judgment and found that The Highlands, which is a private landowner, had not
1
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been expressly or impliedly authorized by the Legislature to use the power of eminent
domain to condemn an easement from its private landowner neighbor, even though a
portion of the eminent domain act provides that the right of eminent domain may be
exercised on behalf of "roads, streets, and alleys for public vehicular use" and "by-roads
leading from highways to residences and farms."
Standard of Review: In reviewing an order denying a motion for entry of default
judgment and dismissing a case, the Court of Appeals reviews the legal conclusions used
to support the decision for correctness, and reviews findings of fact under a clear error
standard of review.
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES, RULES, AND REGULATIONS
I.

Constitution of the State of Utah, Article I, Section 1
All men have the inherent and inalienable right to enjoy and defend
their lives and liberties; to acquire, possess and protect property; to worship
according to the dictates of their consciences; to assemble peaceably,
protest against wrongs, and petition for redress of grievances; to
communicate freely their thoughts and opinions, being responsible for the
abuse of that right.

II.

Constitution of the State of Utah, Article I, Section 22
Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public use
without just compensation.

III.

Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-29(3).
(3) The trustee's deed shall operate to convey to the purchaser,
without right of redemption, the trustee's title and all right, title, interest,
and claim of the trustor and the trustor's successors in interest and of all
persons claiming by, through, or under them, in and to the property sold,
including all right, title, interest, and claim and to the property acquired by
the trustor or the trustor's successors in interest subsequent to the execution
2
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of the trust deed, which trustee's deed shall be considered effective and
relate and relate back to the time of the sale.
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-501 (2008), a copy of which is attached to the
Appellant's Brief as Addendum 1.
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-504 (2008). Conditions precedent to taking.
(1) Before property can be taken it must appear that:
(a) the use to which it is to be applied is a use authorized by law;
(b) the taking is necessary for the use;
(c) construction and use of all property sought to be condemned will
commence within a reasonable time as determined by the court, after
the initiation of proceeding under this party; and
(d) if already appropriated to some public use, the public use to
which it is to be applied is a more necessary public use.
(2)

(a) As used in this section, "governing body" means: t
(i) for a county, city, or town, the legislative body of the
county, city, or town; and
(ii) for any other political subdivision of the state, the person
or body with authority to govern the affairs of the political
subdivision.
(b) Property may not be taken by a political subdivision of the state
unless the governing body of the political subdivision approves the
taking.
(c) Before taking a final vote to approve the filing of an eminent
domain action, the governing body of each political subdivision
intending to take property shall provide written notice to each owner
of property to be taken of each public meeting of the political
subdivision's governing body at which a vote on the proposed taking
is expected to occur and allow the property owner the opportunity to
be heard on the proposed taking.
(d) The requirement under Subsection (2)(c) to provide notice to a
property owner is satisfied by the governing body mailing the
written notice to the property owner:
(i) at the owner's address as shown on the records of the
county assessor's office; and
(ii) at least ten business days before the public meeting.

3
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Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-505. Negotiation and disclosure required
before voting to approve an eminent domain action.
Each person who seeks to acquire property by eminent domain or
who intends to use eminent domain to acquire property if the property
cannot be acquired in a voluntary transaction shall:
(1)
before taking a final vote to approve the filing of an eminent domain
action, make a reasonable effort to negotiate with the property owner for
the purchase of the property; and
(2)
as early in the negotiation process under Subsection (1) as
practicable but no later than 14 days before a final vote is taken to approve
the filing of an eminent domain action, unless the court for good cause
allows a shorter period before filing:
(a)
advise the property owner of the owner's rights to mediation and
arbitration under Section 78B-6-522, including the name and current
telephone number of the property rights ombudsman, established in Title
13, Chapter 43, Property Rights Ombudsman Act; and
(b)
provide the property owner a written statement explaining that oral
representations or promises made during the negotiation process are not
binding upon the person seeking to acquire the property by eminent
domain.
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-507 (2009), Complaint - Contents.
(1)

The complaint shall contain:

(b)
the names of all owners and claimants of the property, if
known, or a statement that they are unknown, who must be styled
defendants;

4
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case and Course of Proceedings
This appeal is about whether a private, for profit real estate developer, The
Highlands, can acquire a portion of its neighbor's real property by eminent domain, so
that the developer can build a road to service its contemplated residential development.
BV Jordanelle, which now owns the property sought to be condemned, was not a party to
the underlying district court proceeding before Judge Pullan where this issue was first
addressed. Moreover, PWJ, the prior owner of the property, chose not to defend itself in
that action, and was defaulted. Notwithstanding that fact, Judge Pullan, in a detailed,
thorough, and well-written decision, decided that The Highlands could not condemn BV
Jordanelle's land because it had not been expressly or impliedly authorized by the Utah
Legislature to exercise the power of eminent domain, and he dismissed the Highlands'
Complaint with prejudice. This appeal followed, and BV Jordanelle was thereafter
substituted in for PWJ as appellee. BV Jordanelle then filed a Suggestion of Mootness
with the Court. The Court deferred a ruling on the mootness questions raised by BV
Jordanelle, however, and directed the parties to brief the merits. The Suggestion of
Mootness remains pending, as do the merits questions if jurisdiction is found.
Statement of Facts
1.

Appellant The Highlands is a private entity which owns a parcel of real

property in Wasatch County, Utah (hereinafter the "Highlands Parcel") that it plans to
develop as part of a residential development known as The Highlands at Jordanelle. (R.
105-106.)
5
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2.

Lying directly west of the Highlands Parcel is real property (hereinafter the

"PWJ Parcel") formerly owned by original appellee PWJ. (R. 105.)
3.

The Highlands wants to connect its planned development on the Highlands

Parcel to a proposed and platted road known as the Talisman Parkway by building a road
over the neighboring PWJ Parcel. (R. 105.)1
4.

According to The Highlands, it initially sought to "secure" an easement for

the desired road across the PWJ Parcel from PWJ, but PWJ refused to discuss the matter.
(R. 104.)
5.

On September 5, 2008, The Highlands hand-delivered a letter to PWJ. The

letter generally informed PWJ of its rights under section 78B-6-505 of the Utah Code.
(R. 2, 104.)
6.

The letter did not, however, include the name and current telephone number

of the property rights ombudsman, as required by section 78-6-505(2)(a) of the Utah
Code. (R. 2, 104.)
7.

Thereafter, on September 23, 2008, The Highlands filed a complaint in the

Utah Fourth Judicial District for Wasatch County, State of Utah, instituting this action
(the "Complaint") and purported to state a cause of action for condemnation. (R. 103.)
8.

PWJ was the only defendant named by The Highlands in the Complaint as

an owner or claimant of the property. (R. 24.)
9.
1

However, at the time the Highlands filed suit, the PWJ parcel was already

The "road" identified and described by The Highlands as the Talisman Parkway has not been constructed but is
only considered an existing "road" by virtue of a plat being filed with the Wasatch County Recorder's Office,
wherein the proposed "road" is identified.

6
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encumbered by a Deed of Trust with Assignment of Rents (the "Deed of Trust"),
recorded on April 4, 2008, in favor of BV Lending, LLC (hereinafter "BV Lending"), an
affiliate of BV Jordanelle, as beneficiary. (A true and correct copy of the Deed of Trust,
which was recorded on April 4, 2008 (more than five months before the filing of the
Complaint), as Entry No. 334115, in Book 0963, beginning on page 2246, in the official
records of the Wasatch County Recorder, State of Utah, is attached to BV Jordanelle's
Suggestion of Mootness ("Mootness Memo") as Exhibit "A.")
10.

The Deed of Trust was executed by PWJ, as trustor, for the benefit of BV

Lending, as beneficiary, as security for two promissory notes made by PWJ to BV
Lending in the original principal amounts of $2,116,402, and $4,232,804, respectively.
(Mootness Memo, Ex. "A," page 1.)
11.

As the beneficiary of the Deed of Trust, B V Lending had a recorded lien

against the PWJ Parcel, and a clear interest in any condemnation proceeding involving
the PWJ Parcel. {See R. 24.)
12.

BV Lending later assigned its interest as beneficiary of the Deed of Trust

to BV Jordanelle, by an instrument dated October 29, 2009. (A true and correct copy of
this Assignment of Deed of Trust is attached to the Mootness Memo as Exhibit "B.")
13.

PWJ did not appear to defend against the lawsuit filed by The Highlands,

and on October 16, 2008, the clerk of the district court signed an Entry of Default in this
matter against PWJ. (R. 35-36.)
14.

However, the district court judge, the Honorable Derek P. Pullan, denied

The Highlands' subsequent Motion for Entry ofDefault Judgment in a decision dated
7
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December 29, 2008, and thereafter dismissed the case with prejudice. (R. 91.)
15.

Judge Pullan reasoned that The Highlands, as a private limited liability

company, had no authority under Utah law to file a condemnation action for the purpose
of acquiring an easement for the desired road across the PWJ Parcel because it lacked the
express or implied power of eminent domain. (Id.)
16.

The Highlands filed a notice of appeal on January 7, 2009. (R. 109).

17.

The relief requested by The Highlands on appeal is reversal of Judge

Pullan's order of dismissal, and a remand back to Judge Pullan to enter a default
judgment and "to determine a reasonable time for the Highland[s] to complete the
dedication of the Easement as a public roadway." (Aplt's. Br. at 28.)
18.

On November 5, 2009, PWJ's entire fee simple interest in the PWJ Parcel

was foreclosed out and eliminated by a Trustee's Deed and the provisions of Utah Code
Ann. § 57-1-29(3). The Trustee's Deed, which conveyed the PWJ Parcel to BV
Jordanelle as the new fee simple owner, was recorded November 10, 2009, as Entry No.
354092, in Book 1004, beginning on page 0187, in the official records of the Wasatch
County Recorder, State of Utah. (A true and correct copy of the Trustee's Deed is
attached to the Mootness Memo as Exhibit "C")
19.

On November 9, 2009, The Highlands moved to substitute BV Jordanelle

as the appellee and real party in interest in this action in place of PWJ, citing the
conveyance of the property to BV Jordanelle at the Trustee's Sale. (Aplt's Mot. for
Substitution of Parties at 2.)
20.

No objection was made, and on December 3, 2009, this Court granted The
8
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Highlands' motion for substitution. (A true and correct copy of the Order is attached to
the Mootness Memo as Exhibit "D.")
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Article I, Section 1 of the Utah Constitution provides in part that "[a]ll men have
the inherent and inalienable right to enjoy and defend their lives and liberties; to acquire,
possess and protect property . . .." The listing of one's property rights immediately after
the right to defend one's life and liberty underscores the importance of these inherent and
inalienable rights regarding property. Yet, in the face of these Constitutional rights, The
Highlands, a private, for profit limited liability company, is seeking to condemn a portion
of a neighboring private landowner's property so that it can increase the value of its own
land. This Court should not allow that to happen.
The Highlands falls far short in its brief of showing how the Eminent Domain Act,
Utah Code Ann. §§ 58B-6-501 through 522, authorizes a private party to condemn
property for the purpose of constructing a road to a residential development. But, before
this Court addresses The Highlands' bold and unsupported theory regarding
condemnation (and perhaps without even having to address that argument), Judge
Pullan's decision should be affirmed for two initial and independent reasons.
First, the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this appeal as a result of The
Highlands' failure to initially name BV Lending as a defendant in the case below, and the
subsequent foreclosure of the very property interest sought to be condemned. Because
BV Lending's interest in the PWJ Parcel was recorded, The Highlands was on legal,
record notice of BV Lending's security interest and its consequent legal obligation to
9
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name BV Lending as a defendant in the Complaint if it wanted to affect that interest in
any way. And, upon the completion of the foreclosure of PWJ's interest and conveyance
of the PWJ parcel to BV Jordanelle by the Trustee's Deed dated November 5, 2009, The
Highlands lost the ability to pursue even their limited condemnation claim against PWJ's
interest in the PWJ Parcel, as PWJ's interest in the land, and The Highland's attempt to
obtain that interest by condemnation, was wiped out by the foreclosure. Accordingly, the
Court lacks jurisdiction over this matter.
Second, The Highlands' initiation of the underlying action was and is incredibly
premature. Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-505(2)(a) provides that "[e]ach person who seeks to
acquire property by eminent domain . . . shall... advise the property owner of the
owner's rights to mediation and arbitration under Section 78B-6-522, including the name
and current telephone number of the property rights ombudsman . . . ." (emphasis
added.) The undisputed record below demonstrates that The Highlands failed to comply
with this statutory requirement before it filed the Complaint. This failure it futile to The
Highlands'claims.
Furthermore, The Highlands failed to demonstrate below, and fails to demonstrate
or even allege here, that the "road" The Highlands seeks to access by condemning private
property for an easement has been constructed and otherwise approved for use by
residents of The Highlands or anyone else. Indeed, the Talisman Parkway which The
Highlands wants to access has not been constructed, and may never be constructed.
Accordingly, any condemnation for an easement to provide an access would be
premature where it is uncertain as to whether the condemned property and proposed
10
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easement would even lead to another public road or otherwise fulfill its intended purpose.
As a result, this appeal should be dismissed without any consideration of the merits
because the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, and also because this entire
proceeding is premature and unnecessary.
Even if this Court has jurisdiction and The Highlands' condemnation action is not
premature, BV Jordanelle is entitled to prevail on the merits, and Judge Pullan's logical
and well-reasoned decision should be affirmed. Simply put, the Eminent Domain Act
does not authorize the conduct called for by The Highlands, namely, the condemnation
by a private landowner of its neighbor's land to be used as a road to access that private
landowner's private development. For reasons that should be too obvious to mention, a
private party seeking to exercise the power of eminent domain must have direct
authorization from the Legislature. This authorization can be express or, in some
instances, clearly implied. There is no question that the Eminent Domain Act does not
give express authorization to The Highlands in this case. Accordingly, the question is
whether the Eminent Domain Act impliedly authorizes a private limited liability
company to condemn property for construction of a road to its private residential
development. The answer to that question is an emphatic no. Indeed, the public policy
implications of any other answer are difficult to even fathom. If the Utah Legislature
wants to give private landowners the power to condemn their neighbor's property without
any federal, state or local governmental entity being involved in the process it certainly
can do so, but it has not done so yet and may elect for numerous reasons to never do so.
The Highlands would interpret the absence of express references to government
11
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entities in section 502—entities that would likely be impliedly if not expressly authorized
to exercise this authority—as evidence that any private party has the authority under the
Eminent Domain Act to condemn private property, so long as it is for a public use. The
Highlands also looks for support in half-century and century old cases where courts
addressed the public uses of mining and water. The Highlands' arguments are misplaced
and otherwise unpersuasive.
First, because public entities may and do use their eminent domain authority to
establish and extend public streets, denying a private party this enormous power will not
render worthless or seriously impair the grant of authority to condemn. Second, the
various statutes comprising the Eminent Domain Act demonstrate clearly that the Utah
Legislature intended for only public entities to exercise this powerful authority. Third,
the outdated cases cited by The Highlands are unpersuasive because the Eminent Domain
Act has significantly changed since those cases were decided and those courts addressed
"public purposes" significantly different than the one at issue in this case. Finally, public
policy strongly supports an unequivocal rejection of The Highlands' proposed theory on
eminent domain. Under The Highlands' theory, any private party can exercise the power
of eminent domain to condemn another's private property, provided the land taken is for
a public purpose. In other words, a non-resident could purchase landlocked property in
Utah without considering access to the property, and, so long as he was seeking to build a
road or byway to a proposed residence, such an individual could simply exercise eminent
domain against adjacent landowners. Fortunately, such is not the law in Utah. Judge
Pullan's decision should be affirmed in all respects.
12
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ARGUMENT
The Highlands' appeal should be denied for at least three independent reasons, the
first two of which have nothing to do with the merits. First, this Court lacks subject
matter jurisdiction over the appeal in light of The Highlands' failure to name BV Lending
in the original Complaint and the subsequent foreclosure of the original defendant's
interest in the property at issue. Second, this action was premature when it was filed and
it remains premature now because (1) the undisputed record demonstrates that The
Highlands failed to satisfy its obligations under the Eminent Domain Act before initiating
this action, and (2) the Talisman Parkway—which is the "road" on BV Jordanelle's
property that The Highlands seeks to access by condemning private property for an
easement—has not even been constructed. Third, the Eminent Domain Act does not
expressly or impliedly authorize private parties to exercise eminent domain to take
property for the purpose of constructing a road to a proposed private residential
development. It simply cannot be the law, as suggested by The Highlands, that any
private party may exercise the fundamental power of eminent domain so long as it seeks
to do so for a statutorily-defined public use.
I.

THE COURT LACKS SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION OVER THIS
APPEAL, AND THIS APPEAL SHOULD BE DISMISSED,
As explained in BV Jordanelle's prior briefing to this Court, Utah law requires

that to obtain an easement by eminent domain across real property, a condemnor (such as
The Highlands) must name as defendants in the Complaint all persons who qualify as
2

Because the parties have already submitted briefs specifically addressing this issue, BV
Jordanelle will only briefly summarize its jurisdictional argument in this brief.
13
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"owners" or "claimants" of the property, Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-507(l)(b), including
any persons claiming any valuable right or interest, including a security interest. See
Brigham City v. Chase, 85 P. 436, 438-439 (Utah 1906) (explaining that the statutory
terms "owner" and "claimant" in the context of eminent domain proceedings include all
persons having "any lawful interest in the property" and citing inclusion of mortgagees,
among others). Cf. Mtn. Fuel Supply Co. v. Dixie #11 P'ship, 806 P.2d 239 (Utah Ct.
App. 1991) (providing example of case where condemnor seeking an easement properly
named both the owner and the beneficiary under the trust deed). In this case, BV
Jordanelle's predecessor in interest, BV Lending, was the named beneficiary of an
existing, recorded Deed of Trust on the PWJ Parcel securing promissory notes written by
PWJ for more than six million dollars at the time of the filing of the Complaint. That
Deed of Trust was of record and on file with the Wasatch County Recorder's Office,
providing record notice to the world of BV Lending's interest in the PWJ Parcel.
Accordingly, BV Lending held an interest in PWJ Parcel, i.e., it was a claimant, and thus
was a necessary party to the condemnation suit below under Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6507(l)(b). BV Lending could not be made to suffer injury to its security interest (and
contingent right to become an owner in the event of a foreclosure) without due process of
law.
The Utah Supreme Court has explained that the consequence of the condemnor's
failure to name an interested party "is that against the omitted persons the condemnation
will be nugatory." See Brigham City, 85 P. at 439. Consequently, the result of The
Highlands' failure to name BV Lending as a defendant below is that the trial court, and
14
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now this Court, lacked jurisdiction to make any rulings which could impair the interest in
the PWJ Parcel held by BV Lending or its successor, BV Jordanelle, but it could make
rulings concerning PWJ's interest in the parcel. See Town ofTremonton v. Johnston, 164
P. 190 (Utah 1917) (holding that statutory procedures for instituting eminent domain
proceedings are jurisdictional and cannot be disregarded).
Moreover, upon the completion of the foreclosure of PWJ's interest in the PWJ
Parcel and conveyance of the PWJ parcel to BV Jordanelle by the Trustee's Deed dated
November 5, 2009, The Highlands lost the ability to pursue even their limited
condemnation claim against PWJ's interest in the PWJ Parcel, because PWJ's interest
ceased to exist. By operation of Utah law, the Trustee's Deed conveyed to the purchaser
at the trustee's sale, i.e., BV Jordanelle, "without right of redemption, the trustee's title
and all right, title, interest, and claim of the trustor [i.e., PWJ] and the trustor's successors
in interest and of all persons claiming by, through, or under them [i.e., The Highlands] in
and to the property sold .. . ." Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-28(3). In short, any claim The
Highlands could have acquired to the PWJ Parcel through the instant lawsuit is a claim
which has now been conveyed to BV Jordanelle by operation of the statute. This Court
lacks jurisdiction over this appeal, and it should be dismissed.3

3

Assume that The Highlands had succeeded below and had obtained from Judge Pullan
an order conveying the easement it requests prior to the foreclosure sale occurring. Any
conveyance of the easement to The Highlands would have been encumbered by the BV
Lending Deed of Trust, and the foreclosure of that Deed of Trust would have eliminated
The Highlands' title along with the title held by PWJ to the remaining PWJ Parcel. In
other words, any conveyance of a part of the PWJ Parcel to The Highlands, whether
voluntarily or involuntarily under a condemnation order, would have been encumbered
by the prior, recorded Deed of Trust.
15
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II.

THE HIGHLANDS PREMATURELY INITIATED THE UNDERLYING
ACTION, AND THIS APPEAL SHOULD BE DISMISSED.
The underlying action before Judge Pullan was initiated prematurely for at least

two reasons. First, The Highlands failed to satisfy its obligations under the Eminent
Domain Act before initiating this action. Second, and more importantly than that
procedural defect, the "road" on BV Jordanelle's property that The Highlands seeks to
access for an easement has not even been constructed, and may never be constructed. In
other words, even if the Court were to allow The Highlands to condemn the 200 feet or so
of land it wants for the construction of a short byway, there is no guarantee that this
byway would ever be connected to a constructed, dedicated public road.
A.

The Highlands Failed to Satisfy Its Statutory Pre-Requisites to Filing
an Eminent Domain Action,

The Utah Legislature, which undoubtedly values the protection of private property
rights, has expressly mandated that parties take certain actions before initiating an
eminent domain action. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 78B-6-504 & 505. Specifically, Utah
Code Ann. § 78B-6-505(2)(a) provides that "[e]ach person who seeks to acquire property
by eminent domain . . . shall. . . advise the property owner of the owner's rights to
mediation and arbitration under Section 78B-6-522, including the name and current
telephone number of the property rights ombudsman . . . ." (emphasis added.) Created in
1997,4 the Office of the Property Rights Ombudsman (hereinafter the "OPRO") provides
critical services to landowners, including advising property owners "about takings,

4

The legislation creating the OPRO passed unanimously through both the Utah House of
Representatives and the Senate. See Session Laws of Utah 2004, Chap. 233 § 10.
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eminent domain, and land use law." Utah Code Ann. § 13-43-203. When dealing with
an area of law such as takings and eminent domain, the public policy of providing
landowners with tools to protect their property interests is obvious, especially in light of
the inherent and inalienable property rights guaranteed by the Utah Constitution. See
Utah Const. Art. I, Sec. 1. But regardless of the reasons underlying this statutory
requirement, the Utah Legislature has left no doubt as to the pre-lawsuit requirements for
a party seeking to condemn private property; among other things, that party shall inform
the landowner of his or her rights, including the name and current telephone number of
the property rights ombudsman. Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-505(2)(a) (emphasis added.)
That indisputably did not happen here.
In this case, The Highlands sent a letter to PWJ, wherein it stated:
Under section 78-34-4.5, my client is required to notify your client of its
right to seek mediation or arbitration under Section 78-34-21 with the Utah
State Property Rights Ombudsman, Heber M. Wells Building, 2nd Floor,
160 East 300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah.
(R. 2.) Glaringly absent from this letter is the actual name of the ombudsman, or the
telephone number for the ombudsman. This omission did not go unnoticed by Judge
Pullan. In his final order, Judge Pullan made the following findings of fact:
16.

On September 5, 2008, The Highlands hand-delivered a letter to
PWJ. The letter generally informed PWJ of its rights under section
78B-6-505(2)(a) of the Utah Code.

17.

The letter did not include the name and current telephone number of
the property rights ombudsman, as required by section 78B-6505(2)(a) of the Utah Code.

(R. 105.) The Highlands has not challenged these findings of fact and the Utah
17
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Legislature has left no wiggle room on this issue. The Highlands' failure to satisfy the
requirements under section 505(2)(a) render its Complaint premature and serves as an
additional basis to either affirm the district court or otherwise dismiss this appeal.
B.

The Requested Easement over BV Jordanelle's Land Would Connect
to no Existing, Constructed Public Road.

"A condemnation action to support a public benefit that may never be initiated is
premature." Bd. of County Comm 'rs of the County ofMorgan v. Kobobel, 176 P.3d 860,
865 (Colo. Ct. App. 2007); see also Colorado & S. Ry. v. Dist. Court, 493 P.2d 657, 659
(Colo. 1972) (recognizing that if the property sought to be condemned by the railroad
would ultimately not be used as a point of crossing, the "railroad would have acquired
land or an easement that it cannot use, and the one against whom the decree was entered
would have had taken from it property actually not subject to condemnation"); Silver
Dollar Metro. Dist. v. Goltra, 66 P.3d 170, 175 (Colo. Ct. App. 2002) (holding that
"condemning the property for core drilling is not a taking for a public use because the
taking would be to determine if it is possible that the property could be used for a public
use in the future and to explore and compete with other projects.")
In this case, The Highlands seeks to connect its planned development on the
Highlands Parcel to a proposed and platted road known as the Talisman Parkway by
building a road over the neighboring PWJ Parcel owned by BV Jordanelle. (R. 105.)
However, The Highlands has not demonstrated (because it cannot do so) that the

18
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Talisman Parkway is an existing, constructed public road.5 This failure is significant
because without a constructed public road to which the proposed easement could connect,
the stated public use of providing public access to a residential development would not be
immediately available, and it is possible that it would never be available. In other words,
the "public use" may never be initiated. Accordingly, The Highlands' action is
premature, and this appeal should be dismissed. See, e.g., Kobobel, 176 P.3d at 865.

III. JUDGE PULLAN PROPERLY FOUND THAT THE HIGHLANDS WAS
NOT AUTHORIZED BY THE UTAH LEGISLATURE TO EXERCISE
THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN TO CONDEMN AN EASEMENT
OVER ITS NEIGHBOR'S PROPERTY FOR A ROAD.
This case is not just about whether The Highlands is entitled to an easement over
200 feet of BV Jordanelle's property so that it can access its property. The ramifications
of the case are far broader than that. The real question here is whether one private, for
profit landowner has the right under Utah law to condemn its neighbor's property for a
road or any other stated public use, when that private, for profit landowner has not been
expressly authorized by the Utah Legislature to do so. It does not.
A private party must have direct authority from the Legislature in order to exercise
eminent domain. See 1 A-3 Nichols on Eminent Domain § 3.03(1) ("The right to
authorize the exercise of eminent domain is a legislative power. In the absence of direct
authority from the legislature, there can be no taking of private property for a public use,
except in cases where the owner consents to the taking."). uThe right to exercise the
power of eminent domain may be delegated to a private corporation." Id at § 3.03(9)(a);
5

Indeed, the Talisman Parkway, which would be partially located on the PWJ Parcel
owned by BV Jordanelle, has not yet been constructed and may never be constructed.
19
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(3)(b)(ii). Such a delegation of authority, however, "must be affirmatively shown either
by express words or by necessary implication." Id. at § 9(a). And, as Judge Pullan
rightly recognized, the necessity from which an implied grant of authority might arise
must be compelling. (R. 99 ("'there can be no implication unless it arises from a
necessity so absolute that, without it, the grant itself will be defeated. It must, also, be a
necessity which arises from the very nature of things, over which the corporation has no
control; it must not be a necessity created by the company itself for its own convenience
or for the sake of the economy.'" {quoting 1A-3 Nichols on Eminent Domain § 3.03(3)(d)
Id. at § 3.03(3)(d))), (internal quotations omitted). Furthermore, as recognized by the
Utah Supreme Court, a grant of eminent domain authority to a private party may only be
implied where "any other construction of the statute or statutes involved would render
worthless or seriously impair the grant of power to condemn for the given purposes."
Bertagnoli v. Baker, 215 P.2d 626, 628 (Utah 1950).
As explained more fully below, The Highlands has in no way been authorized to
exercise eminent domain to create a road to its proposed residential development. Not
only is there clearly (and admittedly) no express authorization, but there is likewise no
implied authority. This logical conclusion is only bolstered when viewed in the context
of Utah's public policy and the absurdities that would result from adoption of The
Highlands' theory of eminent domain.
A.

The Eminent Domain Act does not Expressly Authorize The Highlands
to Exercise Eminent Domain.

Judge Pullan correctly found, and the Highlands does not appear to dispute, that
20
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the Eminent Domain Act does not expressly authorize The Highlands to exercise eminent
domain to construct a public road to access its proposed residential development. (R.
93.) This absence of express authorization should not be minimized. In light of the
strong Constitutional protections regarding property rights in Utah, see Utah Const. Art.
I, Sec. 1, and the fact that the common definition of "eminent domain" is the power of a
governmental entity to convert privately owned property, logic dictates that if the Utah
Legislature intended to authorize private parties to exercise eminent domain to build a
road to their residential developments, it would have expressly and clearly provided this
authorization in the Eminent Domain Act. Indeed, Judge Pullan, in his thorough and
well-written decision below, provided a long list of situations where the Utah Legislature
has expressly granted to various entities (including private entities) eminent domain
authority. (R. 98, 99 (citing eighteen different statutes where the Legislature expressly
granted the power of eminent domain).); see also In the Matter of the Condemnation of
Certain Land by Norm Luloff 512 N.W.2d 267, 270 (Iowa 1994) (recognizing that the
Iowa Legislature enacted a statute that provides, in part: "The right to take private
property for public use is hereby conferred: . . . (2) Upon the owner or lessee of lands,
which have no public or private way to the lands, for the purpose of providing a public
way, not exceeding forty feet in width, which will connect with exising public road . . .

The absence of express authorization in the Eminent Domain Act is compelling
evidence that the Legislature never intended to authorize a private party to exercise
eminent domain for the purpose of building a road to a proposed residential development.
21

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Indeed, when governmental entities exercise the power for the benefit of the constituents
they serve, they do so pursuant to express statutory provisions which insure that the
process if fair, open, deliberate and protective of private property rights. That is why
Utah's Act, among other things, requires that public votes be taken in public meetings
after appropriate notice before a condemnation action can be undertaken. These same
procedural and substantive safeguards do not exist for private entities like The Highlands.
The Highlands was not required to advertise a public meeting and take a public vote in an
open meeting before it filed its Complaint to condemn BV Jordanelle's property. Judge
Pullan was right to dismiss this case, and his decision should be affirmed.
B.

There Is No Implied Authorization in the Eminent Domain Act
Supporting The Highlands' Position.

The absence of any implied authority to an entity such as The Highlands is
manifested in numerous ways. First, because public entities may use eminent domain
authority to establish and extend public streets (subject to numerous procedural and
substantive protections as discussed briefly above), denying a private party this enormous
power will not render worthless or seriously impair the grant of authority to condemn.
Second, the various statutes comprising the Eminent Domain Act demonstrate that the
Legislature intended for only public entities to exercise this powerful authority. Third,
the outdated cases cited by The Highlands are unpersuasive because the Eminent Domain
Act has significantly changed since those cases were decided and those courts addressed
"public purposes" significantly different than the one at issue in this case. Fourth, public
policy strongly supports denying private parties this awesome authority.
22
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1.

Denying private parties the authority to exercise eminent
domain will not render worthless or meaningless Section 501 of
the Eminent Domain Act.

The Utah Supreme Court stated that a grant of eminent domain authority may be
implied if "any other construction of the statute or statutes involved would render
worthless or seriously impair the grant of power to condemn for the given purposes."
Bertagnoli v. Baker, 215 P.2d 626, 628 (Utah 1950). Accordingly, in order for The
Highlands to demonstrate that it is impliedly authorized to exercise eminent domain, it
must demonstrate that its inability to exercise this authority would render worthless or
seriously impair the grant of power to condemn property for use as a road. See id. There
is no such gutting of the Eminent Domain Act in this case should the Court deny The
Highlands' theory. As Judge Pullan recognized, "[u]nder Utah law, counties, cities, and
towns may use this grant of eminent domain authority to establish and extend public
streets. Therefore, denying private parties the right to condemn property for this public
use will not 'render worthless or seriously impair' the express grant of eminent domain
authority is section 78B-6-501." (R. 92.); see also Bertagnoli, 215 P.2d at 628.
As Judge Pullan correctly recognized, if the "road" that The Highlands wants to
build is truly necessary to benefit and advance the public interest, either Wasatch County
or the Utah Department of Transportation can obtain the property and build the road.
Neither entity, of course, has done so. There simply is no implied authorization to The
Highlands, and Judge Pullan should be affirmed.6

6

In fact, Wasatch County, the public entity that would have the authority to exercise
eminent domain in this situation and an entity that is in a much better position to
23
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2.

The various statutes comprising the Eminent Domain Act
support the position that only public entities may exercise
eminent domain to condemn land for use of a public road.

The Highlands attempts to limit the Court's analysis to only the language of
section 501 of the Eminent Domain Act in the hope that the other sections of the Act will
be ignored. (See, e.g., Appl'ts. Br. at (including only section 501 as a controlling statute.)
The Eminent Domain Act, however, consists of much more than just section 501. And
subsequent sections of the Eminent Domain Act demonstrate that the Legislature did not
intend to grant private parties the authority to exercise eminent domain to condemn land
for construction of a private road to a residence.
For example, in outlining the conditions precedent to taking under the Eminent
Domain Act, the Legislature provided that:
(2)

(a) As used in this section, "governing body" means:
(i) for a county, city, or town, the legislative body of the
county, city, or town; and
(ii) for any other political subdivision of the state, the person
or body with authority to govern the affairs of the political
subdivision.
(b) Property may not be taken by a political subdivision of the state
unless the governing body of the political subdivision approves the
taking.
(c) Before taking a final vote to approve the filing of an eminent
domain action, the governing body of each political subdivision
intending to take property shall provide written notice to each owner
of property to be taken of each public meeting of the political

understand or recognize what is a "public use," has decided in its wisdom not to exercise
its eminent domain authority. (R. 115.)
n

Indeed, the argument that this Court should limit its analysis to section 501 is belied by
the plain language of that very section. Section 501 provides that "[s]ubject to the
provisions of this part, the right of eminent domain may be exercised on behalf of the
following public uses . . . . " Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-501.
24
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subdivision's governing body at which a vote on the proposed taking
is expected to occur and allow the property owner the opportunity to
be heard on the proposed taking.
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-504. Nowhere in the Eminent Domain Act is there a definition
of "private party" or other definition of who may exercise eminent domain authority.
Furthermore, when the Legislature continues to outline the steps that must be
taken before initiating an eminent domain action, the language makes sense only if it is a
public entity that is exercising the authority:
Each person who seeks to acquire property by eminent domain or
who intends to use eminent domain to acquire property if the property
cannot be acquired in a voluntary transaction shall:
(1)
before taking a final vote to approve the filing of an eminent domain
action, make a reasonable effort to negotiate with the property owner for
the purchase of the property;

Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-505. What private party is going to be "taking a final vote to
approve the filing of an eminent domain action? The obvious purpose of this requirement
is to require those elected and appointed officials who do the public's work to think long
and hard before they vote to condemn someone's property, even if the property is going
to be condemned for the noblest of purposes.
In short, the Eminent Domain Act's defining of a "governing body" and its
reference to "a final vote" demonstrates that, absent express authorization, only public
entities are authorized to exercise eminent domain under the Eminent Domain Act, and
subject to the procedural and substantive protections of the Act. Judge Pullan's ruling
should be affirmed by this Court.
25
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3.

The outdated cases relied on by The Highlands are misplaced
and otherwise unpersuasive.

The Utah cases relied on by The Highlands are not controlling and otherwise are
unpersuasive for at least two reasons. First, the current Eminent Domain Act is
significantly different from the respective eminent domain acts addressed by the early
Utah cases. Second, as explained by Judge Pullan, these early cases "involve the
development of Utah's natural resources, scarce or abundant." (R. 92.)
First, none of the respective versions of the eminent domain act addressed by the
cases cited by The Highlands included the current statutes regarding the conditions
precedent to a taking and the requirements with respect to the property rights
ombudsman. This is significant because these two statutes provide persuasive evidence
that the Utah Legislature intends for only public entities to exercise eminent domain,
unless there is a clear and express authorization to the contrary. See Utah Code Ann. §§
78B-6-504 & 505. Consequently, the decisions of the Utah courts interpreting prior
versions of the Eminent Domain Act are simply unpersuasive.
Second, all of the Utah cases cited by The Highlands' in support of its position
that it can condemn BV Jordanelle's property to build a road addressed either issues of
mining or water. (See Appl'ts. Br. at 8-15.) As Judge Pullan recognized in
distinguishing those cases, the "implied delegation of eminent domain authority to private
mining interests was grounded upon two critical realities. First, the success of the mining

O

The Highlands submitted only one of the statutes in the eminent domain act on the
books in 1898 and 1917. Attached hereto as Addendum 1 and 2 are full copies of the
eminent domain act for those years, respectively.
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industry was inextricably tied to Utah's economy generally. Second, the natural
problems obstructing the development of that industry were significant." (R. 94.)
Accordingly, the district court correctly recognized a critical and dispositive
difference between the cases relied upon by The Highlands and this case. In particular,
Judge Pullan recognized that Utah courts have found an implied grant of authority to a
private party to exercise eminent domain only in cases involving the development of
Utah's natural resources, and they did so because of the importance of that development
to Utah's economic well-being and the difficulty that existed at the time to making that
development successful. In any event, the eminent domain acts at issue in those cases are
different than the current version.
Unlike in those early Utah cases cited by The Highlands, there simply is no
evidence or suggestion that the "construction of public streets providing access to
residential development is inextricably tied to the strength of Utah's economy generally."
(R. 92.) The Utah cases relied on by The Highlands are simply unpersuasive. The
district court should be affirmed.9
4.

Strong public policy reasons exist to reject of The Highlands' position.

Finally, public policy strongly supports an unequivocal rejection of The
9

The Nevada case cited by The Highlands, Glenbrook Homeowners Ass yn, Inc. v. Pettitt,
919 P.2d 1061 (Nev. 1996), is likewise unpersuasive. Aside from the fact that it is
obviously not a Utah case or a case addressing Utah's Eminent Domain Act, the Nevada
eminent domain act at issue expressly limited who could exercise eminent domain
power in certain situations. Id. at 787 (noting that the Nevada statute provided that
"[o]nly a public agency may exercise the power of eminent domain on behalf of a
monorail. .."). Accordingly, the Nevada court held that the rest of the provisions
implicitly authorized private entities to exercise the power of eminent domain. Id.
There is no such limiting language in Utah's Eminent Domain Act.
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Highlands' proposed theory on eminent domain. The Utah Constitution lists one's right
to possess and protect property rights as an inherent and inalienable right. Utah Const.
Art. I, Sec. 1. However, under The Highlands' theory, any private party can exercise the
power of eminent domain and take his or her neighbor's property, provided the land
taken is going to be used for a public purpose. In other words, a non-resident could
purchase landlocked property in Utah without any consideration regarding access to the
property (and for a bargain basement price), and he could thereafter solve his access
problem by using the power of eminent domain to acquire his neighbor's property to
build a road or byway to a proposed residence. Not only would the recognition of such
an extreme power ignore the Utah Constitution, but it would undoubtedly flood the courts
with a wave of eminent domain actions brought by private landowners against their
neighbors. Judge Pullan was right to rule against The Highlands below, and this Court
should do likewise here. The district court should be affirmed.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should affirm the rulings of the district court
in this matter.
DATED this 16th day of April 2010.
RAY QUINNEY & NEBEKER P.C.

/s/ Michael R. Johnson
Michael R. Johnson
Matthew M. Cannon
Attorneys for BVJordanelle
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"
4
rated city or town, or for dradning any county, or incorporated city or town;Uor|i
providraising the banks of streams, removing obstructions therefrom, and wideniigjM
-or.otb
deepening, or straightening their channels; for roads, streets, and alleys, and'ajlg Pis"
C 5other public uses for the benefit of any county, incorporated city or town, or fficg
five h
inhabitants thereof.
therec
4. Wharves, docks, piers, chutes, booms, ferries, bridges, toll roads,
roads, plank and turnpike roads, roads for transportation by traction engines jf||l Mk-' be cor
road locomotives, roads for logging or lumbering purposes, and railroads and s t r a | p | [IP inent •
.with t
railways for public transportation.
'|§||
and cc
5. Reservoirs, dams, water-gates, canals, ditches, flumes, tunnels, ^ u ? | | |
ducts, and pipes for supplying persons, mines, mills, smelters, or other works ^ ° ^ | |
public
tEe reduction of ores, with water for domestic or other uses, or for irrigating P m 3f||
6.
poses, or for draining and reclaiming lands, or for floating logs and lumber onJL
use w]
streams not navigable.
'
Jsfi
Cal. C
Frope
6. Eoads, railroads, tramways, tunnels, ditches, flumes,' pipes, and dump^||

it!
gi

w
m

i

m
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ling places to facilitate the milling, smelting,, or other reduction of ores, or'file
f o r k i n g of mines; outlets, natural or otherwise, for the deposit or conduct of
failings, refuse, or water from mills, smelters, or other works for the reduction
|of ores, or from mines; mill dams; natural gas or oil pipe lines, tanks, or reserlvofr 3 > also &11 occupancy in common by the owners or possessors of different
.^inioes, mills, smelters, or other places for the reduction of ores, of any place for
|§§§£be flow, deposit, or conduct of tailings or refuse matter.
•
i*3 -••*••-• - By-roads leading from highways to residences and farms.
Telegraph, telephone, electric light, and electric power lines.
,.^........ 9- Sewerage of any city or town, or of any settlement of not less than ten
[Sffaniilies, or of any public building belonging to the state, or of any college or
'^feniTersity.
l$p£ •• 10. Canals, reservoirs, dams, ditches, flumes, aqueducts, and pipes for supI p f e ^ n g and storing water for the operation of machinery for the purpose of
s|%enerating and transmitting electricity for power, light, or heat.
Sf$*f • 11. Cemeteries or public parks. [C. L. § 3841*; '90, p. 37; '92, pp. 42, 92;
l » 0 ;:>Col. p.C. 316..
Under section 3841, 0. L. 1888, providing that
Civ. P. 11238*. Sec Sup. '93, p. 995, and
^fSup.'95,p.33
.
l §1233*.
^%U:iEminent domain for pipes, tanks. etc., for nat| i i # S r a l pas, 91552; for right of way for canals,
nals, ditches,
api-efc.,1 1277; f o r railroads, \ 436: for drainage dis-

the right of eminent domain may be exercised in
behalf of steam and horse railroads; "held, that by
implication this right may be exercised in behalf
of electrical railways. Ogden City Railway Company v. Ogden City, 7 XT. 207; 26 P. 288.

^ ^ | / ; -3589. E s t a t e s a n d r i g h t s s u b j e c t t o c o n d e m n a t i o n . The following
iasa classification of the estates and rights in lands subject to be taken for public •

lie:

^ . 1. A fee simple, when taken for public buildings or grounds, or for permaifnSit buildings, for reservoirs and dams, and permanent flooding occasioned thereby,
i p f o r an outlet for a flow, or a place for the deposit of debris or tailings .of a
§|niiie, mill, smelter, or other place for the reduction of ores.
^'""'•..2. An easement, when taken for any other use.
||B';-3. The right of entry upon, and occupation of, lands, and the right to take
refrom such earth, gravel, 'stones, trees, and timber as m a y b e necessary for
| g m e public use. [C. L. § 3842*.
:
l l l f i . C. Civ. P. I 1239*
" ^ ^ ' 3 5 9 0 . P r o p e r t y subject t o c o n d e m n a t i o n . The private property
^Mch may be taken under this chapter includes:
^1tferl. All real property belonging to any person.
;
'"'S. Lands belonging to the state, or to any county, or incorporated city or
ilpwa, not appropriated to some public use.
!&§|iS- Property appropriated to public use; provided, that such property shall
A
|Mot -be taken unlesB for a more necessary public use than that "to which it has been
[^atfeady appropriated.
^ S | ^ U . Franchises for toll roads, toll bridges, ferries, and all other franchises;
'^m^^ded, that such franchises shall not be taken unless for free highways, railroadB,
g a t h e r more necessary public use.
* 1l$r §• • All rights of way for any and all. purposes mentioned in section thirty|f&. hundred and eighty-eight, and any and all structures and improvements
p¥ereon, and the lands held or used in connection therewith, Bhall be subject to
B m S o n n e c t e d with, crossed, or intersected by any other right of way or improveJ | ^ u t or structure thereon. They shall also be subject to a limited use in common
"||fp^u the owner thereof, when necessary; but such uses of crossings, intersections,
« ! ? £ connections shall be made in the manner most compatible with the greatest
l l ^ i b l i c benefit and the least private injury.
|fep|'; 6. All classes of private property not enumerated may be taken for public
i|ge.when such taking is authorized by law. [C. L. § 3843.
| | | C a l . C. Civ. P. g 1240*.
•
§|f?^ 0 P ,M *y zn& franchises of private corporations subject to eminent domain, Con. art. 12, sec. 11.
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3 5 9 1 . C o n d i t i o n s p r e c e d e n t t o c o n d e m n a t i o n . Before property can'
be taken it mnst appear:
1. That the use to which it is to be applied is a nse authorized by law.
2. That the taking is necessary to such nse.
3. If already appropriated to some public use, that the public use to which
it is to be applied is a more necessary public use. [C. L. § 3844.
Cal. a Civ. P. i 1241.

.

3 5 9 2 . R i g h t t o e n t e r t o m a k e s u r v e y , etc. D a m a g e . In all cases-'
where land is required for public use, .the person or corporation or his or its agents
in charge of such use, may survey and locate the same; but it must be located in
the manner which will be most compatible with the greatest public good and the
least private injury, and subject to the provisions of this chapter. The person
or corporation or his or its agents in charge of such public use, may enter upon
the land and make examinations, surveys, and maps thereof, and such entry shall,
constitute no cause of action in favor of the owners of the lands, except for
injuries resulting from negligence, wantonness, or malice. [C. L. § 3845.
Cal. C. Civ. P. 11242*.

. ; 3 5 9 3 . J u r i s d i c t i o n in d i s t r i c t c o u r t . •• C o m p l a i n t verified. .AH
pfdeeedings under this chapter must be brought in the district court for the
county in which the property or some part thereof is situated. The complaint in'
such cases must be verified. [0. L. § 3846*.
Cal. C. CiY. F. 11243*.

3 5 9 4 . C o n t e n t s of c o m p l a i n t . The complaint must contain:
1. The name of the corporation, association, commission, or person in charge
of the public use for which the property is sought, who must be styled plaintiff.
2. The names of all owners and claimants of the property, if known, or a ,
statement that they are unknown, who must be styled defendants.
3. A. statement of the right of the plaintiff.
4. If a right of way be sought, the complaint must show the location, gen- •
era! route, and termini, and must be accompanied with a map thereof, so far a&
the same is involved in the action or proceeding.
5. A description of each piece of land sought to be taken, and whether the
same includes the whole or only part of an entire parcel or tract. All parcels
lying in the county and required for the same public, use-may be included in the same or separate proceedings, at the option of the plaintiff, but the, court * may
consolidate or separate them to suit the convenience of parties. [0. L. § 3847.
Cal. C. Civ. P. 11244*.
SUBDV. 2. Grantors in trust deed to secure in-

debtedness aTe " owners " hereunder. 0. S. L. and.
U. 2J. By. Co. v. Mitchell, 7 U. 505; 27 P. 693.

3 5 9 5 . All p a r t i e s i n i n t e r e s t m a y a p p e a r . All persons in occupation'
of, or having or claiming an interest in, any of the property described in the
complaint, or in the damages for the taking thereofj though not named, may*
appear, plead, and defend, each in respect to his own property or interest, or
that claimed by him, in like manner as if named in the complaint. [C. L. § 3849.

fr.

Cal. C. Civ. P. 21246.

3 5 9 6 . P o w e r of t h e c o u r t . The court or judge thereof sha.ll have
power:
1. To determine the conditions specified in section thirty-five hundred and
ninety-one; to determine the places of making connections and crossings, and to
regulate the manner thereof and of enjoying the common use mentioned in the
fifth subdivision of section thirty-five hundred and ninety.
#
2. To hear and determine all adverse or conflicting claims to the property
sought to be condemned, and to the damages therefor.
3. To determine the respective rights of different parties seeking condenv
nation of the same property. [C. L. § 3850. .
..-.•'
Cal. C. Oiv. P. 21247*

'

'' ~ '
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3 5 9 7 . O c c u p a n c y of p r e m i s e s p e n d i n g action. Notice. H e a r t i n g . Bond. R e s t r a i n i n g order. The plaintiff may move the court or a
judge thereof, at any time after the commencement of suit, on notice to the defendant, if he is a resident of the county, or has appeared in the action, otherwise by
serving a notice directed to him on the clerk of the court, for an order permitting
the plaintiff to occupy the premises sought to be condemned, pending the action,
and to do such work thereon as may be required for the easement sought, according to its nature. The court or a judge thereof shall take proof by affidavit or
otherwise, of the value of the premises sought to be condemned and of the dam• &ges which will accrue from the condemnation, and of the reasons for requiring a
' speedy occupation, and shall grant or refuse the motion according to the equity
;. of the case and the relative damages which may accrue to the parties. If the
motion is granted, the court or judge shall require the plaintiff to execute and
file in court a bond to the defendant, with sureties to be approved by the court or
judge, in a penal sum to be fixed by the court or judge, not less than double the
. value of the premises sought to be condemned and the damages which will ensue
from, condemnation, as the same may appear to the court or judge on the hearing,
and conditioned to pay the adjudged value of the premises and all damages in
• case the property is condemned, and to pay all damages arising from occupation
before judgment in case the premises are'not condemned, and all costs adjudged
to the defendant in the action. The sureties shall justify before the court or
judge after a reasonable notice to the defendant of the time andpiaceof justification. The amounts fixed shall be for the purposes of the motion only, and shall
:
not be admissible in evidence on final hearing. The court or judge may also,
"pending the action, restrain the defendant from hindering or interfering with the
occupation of the premises and the doing thereon of the work required for the
.easement. ['92, pp. 2-3*.
3 5 9 8 . D a m a g e s , h o w assessed. The court, jury, commissioners, or
referee must hear such legal testimony as may be offered by any of the parties
"to the proceedings, and thereupon must ascertain and assess:
£,•;.. 1. • The value of the property sought to be condemned and all improvements
-thereon pertaining to the realty, and of each and every separate estate or interest
.therein; if it consists of different parcels, the value of each parcel and of each
••estate or interest therein shall be separately assessed.
;•.' 2. If the property sought to be condemned constitutes only a part of a large
parcel, the damages which will accrue to the portion not sought to be condemned,
• by reason of its severance from the portion sought to be condemned, and the
*: construction of the improvement in the manner proposed by the plaintiff.
p;. ' 3 . If the property, though no part thereof is taken, will be damaged by the
construction of the proposed improvement, the amount of such damages.
.>;': " 4. Separately, how much the portion not Bought to be condemned, and each
; estate or interest therein, will be benefited, if at all, by the construction of the
.improvement proposed by the plaintiff; and if the benefit shall be equal to
;the- damages assessed, under subdivision two of this section, the owner of the
<parcel shall be allowed no compensation except the value of the portion taken;
but if the benefit shall be less than the damages so assessed, the former shall be
' 8educted from the latter, and the remainder shall be the only damages allowed
in addition to the value of the portion taken.
If the property sought to be condemned be for a railroad, the cost of
r•>. 5.
good and sufficient fences along the line of such railroad between such railroad
and other adjoining lands of the defendant; and the cost of cattle guards where
.fences may cross the line of Buch railroad.
. •; 6. As far as practicable, compensation must be assessed for each source of
..damages separately. [C. L. § 3851*.

mm

m

m

r Cal. C. Civ. P. § 1248*.
. Private property shall not be taken or damaged
aor public use'without just compensation, Con. art.
1, sec. 22.

Where receiver built over unoccupied public
land to which a party afterward acquires title, he
cannot recoveT as damages ..the value of the rail-
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road's improvements. Denver & E. G. W. By. Co.
v. Stancliff, 4 TJ. 117; 7 P. 530.
Where land taken in good faith for the erection
of a schoolhouse, the owner not being known, but
with intention to acquire title by proceedings in

eminent domain, if he should not consent to sucvtP
use of it, he cannot recover as damages the value 'I5i
of such Rchoolhonse. Chase v. Jemmett, 8 IT. 231: '30 P. 757.

3 5 9 9 . D a m a g e s d e e m e d a c c r u e d a t d a t e of service. For the pur-;,
pose of assessing compensation and damages, the right thereto shall be deemed to
have accrued at the date of the service of summons, and its actual value at that
date shall be the measure of compensation for all property to be actually taken, |
and the basis of damages to property not actually taken, but injuriously affected, i
in all cases where such damages are allowed, as provided in the last section. Jjjq';*
improvements put upon the property subsequent to the date of service of sum-:^
mons, shall be included-in the assessment of compensation or damages. [0. L.1!§
§ 3852.
Cal. C. Civ. P. i 1249*.

3 6 0 0 . A c t i o n b e g u n a n e w w h e r e defendant's title defective. If | ¥
the title attempted to be acquired is found to be defective from any cause, the'-P
plaintiff may again institute proceedings to acquire the same as in this chapter" |
prescribed. [C. L. § 3853.
/'
* Cal. C. Civ. P. 11250.

Ifc'r.

-.•>

••Cal. C. Civ. P. §1254*

»'• •\ 3 6 0 5 . App
allowed, may be a*
:the discretion of tj

3 6 0 1 . D a m a g e s t o b e p a i d w i t h i n t h i r t y d a y s . Bond for r a i l r o a d , iv p r .-/.-Cal. C.Civ. P. gi255.
fence. The plaintiff must, within thirty days after final judgment, pay the sumJIIj . J p ; ; - 3 6 0 6 . Proc
the provis
of money assessed; and, if the plaintiff is a railroad company, it shall also exe^fft [pUpcihapter,
fe
cute to the defendant a bond, with sureties, to be determined and approved b y | | | !|.BhaH be applicable
l-qhapter. [0. L. ^
the court or judge, conditioned that the plaintiff shall build proper fences within'f"
*.Cal. C. Civ. P. \ 1256*
six months from the time the railroad is built on or over the land taken. In kaf
action on the bond all damages sustained and the cost of the construction of such;
J'
3 6 0 7 . Righ
fences may be recovered. [C. L. § 3854*.
cauW(|must be construed
j ^ r o p e r t y in any eit
Cal. C. Civ. P. ? 1251*.
"|f|&CM. C. Civ. P. ?1263.
3 6 0 2 . Id. T o w h o m p a i d . E x e c u t i o n if n o t paid. A n n u l l i n g ] ^ H
! £ 3 6 0 8 . Oros
p r o c e e d i n g s . Payment may be made to the defendants entitled thereto, or theff l ^ a right of way sha
money may be deposited in court for the defendants and be distributed to thosefp f p p y t h e court or ia
entitled thereto. If the money be not so paid or deposited, the defendants niaypfjl H ^ 9 0 , pp. 39, 40*.
have execution as in civil cases; and if the money cannot be made on execution/^
the court upon a showing to that effect, must set aside and annul the entire pro^ffl
ceedings, and restore possession of the property to the defendants if possession'|§
has been taken by the plaintiff. [C. L. § 3855.
; ^|jf *
Cal. C." Civ. P. 11252.

' ••-'**

3 6 0 3 . F i n a l o r d e r m a d e u p o n p a y m e n t . R e c o r d i n g s a m e . "When|ff
payments have been made (and the bond given, if the plaintiff elects to give one),f|
as required by the last two sections, the court must make a final order of CODX^
demnation, which must describe the property condemned and the purpose of suc3f|)
condemnation. A copy of the order must be filed in the office of the reeorderv6fj||
the county, and thereupon the property described therein shall vest in the
plaintiff for the purpose -therein specified. [0. L. § 3856.
^

Pi.

^fl|"Jroperty during tj
pand may, if 'necei
Recount thereof.
' for him upon any
S* at any time therea
e the duty of the
mlp^defendant,
to orde
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WW.
a receipt therefor,
except as to the aa
a new trial shall '
held to be an abar
excepting his claii

"$£,• 3 6 0 9 . Actic
gbg brought in the 1
| p o . . 1. Against a
Ibises, a public office
Pippin" a corporation er<
i ! § p , 2. Against a
' Cal. C. Civ. P. 11253.
•' ~$lp gg^hich, by the prov
3 6 0 4 . A u t h o r i z i n g o c c u p a n c y b y plaintiff. Deposit. P a y m e n t : ! "iffr 3. Against ai
gs|ate without being
Effect. At any time after the entry of judgment, or pending an appealfromJ*
||e-Herat.
Civ. P. g 1410. (
the judgment to the supreme court, whenever the plaintiff shall have paid mto.$
fe:Original jurisdiction ii
court for the defendant the full amount of the judgment, and such further sunt"
as may be required by the court as a fund to pay any further damages and
that may be recovered in said proceedings, as well as all damages that may ^ ^ ' ^ I p l r ® ^ a_corporatic
sustained by the defendant, if for any cause the property shall not be finally §§M$>:^
When it hi
taken for public use, the district court in which the proceeding was ^ | « p ^ ^ a s ?rea;fcedJ ealtered
may, upon notice of not less than ten days, authorize the plaintiff, if already He ^ g R i p - ^ 5 j ? e nn ^ ^
possession, to continue therein, and if not. then to take possession of and use & J t J i t $ \ •••• . „ w k i* k*
*
'
'
*
- ^ ^ p * , ^ a forfeiture of its

m i
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not consent to sncli J83
s damages the v a l u :e d
-. Jeinmett, 8 U. 231"; f

Ibrbperty duiing the pendency of and until the final conclusion of the litigation,
H l l a n d may, if necessary, stay all actions and proceedings against the plaintiff on
ipllaccount thereof. • The defendant, "who is entitled to the money paid into court
plf. for him upon any judgment, shall be entitled to demand and receive the same
>. For the puir%fc at any time thereafter upon obtaining an order therefor from the court. I t shall
aJl be deemed to
IP/be the duty of the court or a judge thereof, upon application being made by such
a,l value at thai'
^ defendant, to order and direct that the money so paid into court for him'be
actually taken,
riously aSected,vS H> delivered to him upon his filing a satisfaction of the judgment, or upon his filing
'" " a receipt therefor, and an abandonment of all defenses to the action or proceeding,
ist section. Bo
except as to the amount of damages that he may be entitled to in the event that
service of suma new tidal shall be granted. A payment to a defendant, as aforesaid, shall be
images. [C. L;
held to be an abandonment by such defendant of all defenses interposed by him.
excepting his claim for greater compensation. [C. L. § 3857.
i defective. If
n any cause, the |§§
s i n this chapter:f

• Cal. C. Civ. P. 11254*.

3605.* A p p o r t i o n m e n t of costs. Costs may be allowed or not, and if
allowed, may be apportioned between the parties on the same or adverse sides, in
the discretion of the court. [C. L. § 3858.
, ' Cal. C. Civ. P. 11255.

3 6 0 6 . P r o c e d u r e a p p l i c a b l e . Except as otherwise provided in this
chapter, the provisions of this code relative to civil actions, new trials, and appeals,
mt, pay the sum ffi
shall be applicable to and constitute the rules of practice in the proceedings in this
j shall also exe- : J|
[0. L. § 3859.
ud approved by ^^P;;.:chapter.
J|
Cal.
C.
Civ.
P. 11256*.
>er fences withiti J |
i taken. I n an J |
J •.. 3 6 0 7 . E i g h t s of cities a n d t o w n s n o t affected. Nothing in this code
struction of such SL
Vihust be construed to abrogate or repeal any statute providing for the taking of
•'•property in any city or town for street purposes. [C. L. § 3860.'
•jm

Ld for railroad

f Cal. a CSv. P. ? 1263.

d. A n n u l l i n g ^
i thereto, or the p
ritmted to thosej
defendants may | |
de on execution,^
1 the entire p r o 1 ! !
nts if possession^"'

3 6 0 8 . Crossings t o b e m a d e a n d k e p t in repair. A party obtaining
; ai right of way shall, without delay, construct such crossings as may be required
V-bythe court or judge, and shall keep them and the way itself in good repair.
| [J00, pp. 39, 40*.
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3 6 0 9 . A c t i o n in n a m e of s t a t e , a g a i n s t w h o m . A civil action ma}'
be brought in the name of the state:
1. Against a person who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises, a public office, civil or military, or a franchise, within this state, or an office
mi-in a corporation created by the authority of this state.
2. Against a public officer, civil or military, who does or suffers an act
'which, by the provisions of law, works a forfeiture of his office.
.', 3. Against an association of persons who-act as a corporation within this
state without being legally incorporated. [C. L. § 3529*.
Mont. Civ. P. 11410. Cal. C. Civ. P. i 803*
;' Original jurisdiction in supreme and in district courts, Con. art. 8, sees. 4, 7.

3 6 1 0 . Id. A g a i n s t a c o r p o r a t i o n . A like action may be brought
against a corporation:
1. When it has off ended against a provision of an act by or under which it
was created, altered, or renewed, or any act altering or amending such acts.
2. When it has forfeited its privileges and franchises by non-user.
.
3. When it has committed or omitted an act which amounts to a surrender
or a forfeiture of its corporate rights, privileges, and franchises.
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distent with the provisions of this chapter, apply to the proceedings mentioned
'in this chapter.-

DETAINER.

Cal. C. Civ. P., § 1177* .

Drm to such proofs^
is-. No Continuance!
>s the defendant; byi
I cause therefor.

c

> ^

CHAPTER 65.
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EMINENT DOMAIN.
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U. —; 173 P . 245. .
51 XT. —; 174 P. 164.-
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?. Stay. Either'
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;
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7330.' (3588.) Exercised in behalf of wKat uses. Subject to the provisions of this chapter, the right of eminent domain may be exercised m behalf
of the following-public uses:
1; All public uses authorized by the government of the United btates; •
2. Public buildings and grounds for the use of the state, and all other
public uses authorized by the legislature;
•3. Public-buildings and grounds for the use of any county, incorporated
city or town, or school district; reservoirs, canals, aqueducts, flumes, ditches,
or pipes for conducting water for the use of the inhabitants of any county, or
incorporated city or town, or for draining any county,-or incorporated city or
town; .for'raising the banks of streams, removing obstructions therefrom,
and widening, deepening, or straightening their channels; for roads^ streets,
and alleys, and all other public uses for the benefit of any county, incorpo' rated city or town, or the inhabitants thereof;
• 4 / Wharves, docks, piers, chutes, booms, ferries, bridges, toll roads, byroads, plank and turnpike roads, roads for transportation by traction engines
or rpad locomotives, roads for logging or^ lumbering purposes, and railroads
and'street railways for public transportation;
A, V
5/ Reservoirs, dams, water-gates, canals, ditches; flumes, tunnels, aque- 7 4 ' / • J •
ducts, and pipes for the supplying persons, mines, mills, smelters, or other ^ r f a J<p
works'for the reduction of ores with water for domestic or other uses, or for / - f ^ ) .
irrigation-purposes, or for draining and reclaiming lands, or for floating logs rr >
and lumber on streams not navigable ;
* 6. Roads, railroads, tramways, tunnels, ditches, flumes, pipes, and dumping places to facilitate the milling, smelting, or other reduction of ores, or the
working of mines',"quarries, coal mines, or mineral deposits; outlets, natural
or otherwise, for the deposit or conduct of tailings, refuse, or w;ater from
.mills, smelters, or other works for the reduction of ores; or from' mines, quarries* coal mines, or mineral deposits; mill dams;.natural gas or oil pipe lines,
tanks, or reservoirs; also any occupancy in common by the owners or possessors of-different mines, quarries, coal mines, mineral deposits, mills, smelters,
or other places for the reduction of ores, or any place for the flow, deposit, or
conduct of tailings or refuse matter;
7.' By-roads leading from highways to residences and farms;
ST*' Telegraph, telephone, electric light, and electric power lines, and sites
for electric light and power plants;
9. . Sewerage of any city.or town, or of any settlement of not less than
ten families^ or of any public building belonging to the state, or of any college
or university;
.
•.
• 10. Canals, reservoirs, dams, ditches, flumes, aqueducts, and pipes for .
supplying and storing water for the operation of machinery for the purpose
of generating and transmitting electricity for power, light, or heat;
' 11. * Cemeteries or public parks;
12. Pipe lines for the purpose of conducting any and all liquids connected with the manufacture of beet sugar;
• . .
' ' 13. For sites for mills, smelters, .or other works^'for the reduction of j|>A Hf
ores'and necessary to the successful operation thereof, including the right to
I
take'.lands for the discharge and natural distribution of smoke, fumes, and
dust- therefrom, produced by the operation of such works; provided, that the
powers granted by this subdivision shall not be exercised in any county where
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the population exceeds twenty thousand, or within one mile of the limits of.ll
any incorporated city or town; nor unless the proposed condemnor has the ^ &
right to operate by purchase, option to purchase, or easement, as to at least-^B
seventy-five per cent of the value of land acreage owned by persons or cor- -ll
porations situated within a radius of four miles from the mill, smelter, o r ' I P other works for the reduction of ores; nor beyond the limits of said four miles iSS
radius; nor as to lands covered by contracts, easements, or agreements ex- 1ff$i
isting between the condemnor and the owner of land within said limit and ^
providing for the operation of such mill, smelter, or other works for the re- S t
duction of ores; nor until an action shall have been commenced to restrain the l I l L
operation of such mill, smelter, or other works for the reduction of ores.
' SfS

Am' d '01, p. 19; '07, p. 143; W, p. 50.
Cal. C. Civ. P., § 1238*. See Sup. (1893) p .
995, a n d Sup. (1895) p . 33, § 1233*.
E m i n e n t domain for pipes, t a n k s , e t c , for
n a t u r a l g a s , § 4024; for r i g h t of w a y for canals,
ditches, etc., § 3466; for railroads, for r i g h t of
w a y a n d for w a t e r , § 1228, sub. 3; for* d r a i n a g e
district, § 2046; for city, for w a t e r , § 570x2; i r r i g a t i o n districts, § 3526; county hospital site,
§ 2781.
P r o p e r t y a n d franchises of p r i v a t e c o r p o r a tions s u b j e c t to e m i n e n t domain, Con. a r t 12,
sec. 11.
P r i v a t e p r o p e r t y shall n o t be t a k e n o r d a m a g e d for public u s e w i t h o u t j u s t compensation,
'Con. a r t . 1, sec. 22, and note.
N o p e r s o n shall be deprived of property w i t h out d u e process of law, Con. a r t . 1 sec 7, a n d
note.
C o n d e m n a t i o n b y foreign corporation, § 946.
C o n d e m n a t i o n by s t a t e armory, § 2884.
Con. a r t . 1, sec. 22t providing t h a t p r i v a t e
property shall n o t be t a k e n or d a m a g e d for
public u s e w i t h o u t j u s t compensation, is a
'limitation on exercise of p o w e r of e m i n e n t d o main.
"Kimball v. Grantsville City, 19 U. 368; 57
P. 1.
If t h e land on which s h a d e t r e e s adjacent to
sidewalk stood w a s owned by t h e a b u t t i n g
p r o p e r t y owner, t h e city could only c u t t h e
t r e e s b y c o n d e m n i n g t h e l a n d a n d upon p a y i n g
j u s t compensation.
G i a u q u e v. S. L . City, 42 U. 89; 129 P . 429.
Wihere an owner of land on both sides- of
t h e h i g h w a y acquired title to t h e h i g h w a y b y
failure of t h e public t o u s e a n d w o r k it, s h e
could n o t be compelled t h e r e a f t e r t o allow
it to be opened a s a highway, w i t h o u t c o m pensation being made.
T u t t l e v. Sowadzki, 41 TJ. 501; 126 P . 959.
RAILROADS:
U n d e r § 3841, C. L . 1888, providing t h a t t h e
r i g h t of e m i n e n t domain m a y be exercised i n
behalf of s t e a m a n d horse r a i l r o a d s ; held, t h a t
b y i m p l i c a t i o n t h i s r i g h t m a y be exercised i n
behalf of electrical railways.
Ogden City R a i l w a y Company v. Ogden City,
7 TJ. 207; 26 P . 288.
L a n d which is a p a r t of a railroad's r i g h t of
w a y , b u t n o t used for a n y purpose and n o t
essential t o t h e enjoyment of s u c h r a i l r o a d ' s
f r a n c h i s e a n d property, m a y be a p p r o p r i a t e d
to t h e u s e of a duly incorporated t e l e g r a p h
c o m p a n y for t h e p u r p o s e of c o n s t r u c t i n g a n d
m a i n t a i n i n g i t s lines, since s u c h appropriation
is for a m o r e n e c e s s a r y pubHc use. M e a s u r e of
damages.
P o s t a l Tel. & C. Co. v. O. S. L. B. B . Co., 23
U. 474; 65 P . 735
A city council c a n n o t authorize a p e r m a n e n t
s w i t c h t r a c k , for a private business only, a l o n g
a s t r e e t a n d across a sidewalk, from a s t e a m
r a i l r o a d in t h e s t r e e t , to t h e d e t r i m e n t of p e o ple r e s i d i n g on t h e s t r e e t a n d t o t h e d a m a g e
of t h e i r a b u t t i n g p r o p e r t y ; t h e s t r e e t s b e i n g
dedicated t o public use.
Cereghino v. O. S. L. B . B . Co., 26 TJ. 467;
. 73 P . 634.
A p a r t y w h o s e p r o p e r t y Is about t o be d a m aged in a s u b s t a n t i a l degree for public use is
given s a m e r e m e d i e s as would b e accorded h i m
if h i s p r o p e r t y w e r e actually a p p r o p r i a t e d for
public use.
Stockdale v. B . G. W . By. Co., 28 TJV 201; 77
P . 849.
Railroad c a n n o t subject p r i v a t e property In

a city to b u r d e n s to which it will be subjected > ? &
b y r u n n i n g of c a r s and engines over a switch ? i S §
laid over adjoining property, w i t h o u t proceed- y****-i n g u n d e r l a w of eminent domain.
Id.

• ^tj^ag!

C A N A L S , MINES, ETC.:
£||I
T h e provision of this section and §§ 7332. : ' ^ ^ f e
7338, render, u n d e r ordinary circumstances ' $ 1 8 8
p r o p e r t y a p p r o p r i a t e d for a public use liable to S p
c o n d e m n a t i o n for a n o t h e r public use.
••.'$IF
S a l t L a k e City v. W a t e r & EL P . Co., 24 tr
249; 67 P . 672.
A proceeding fay a power company u n d e r ttie'VsIL
e m i n e n t d o m a i n s t a t u t e to obtain t h e right to S§1P-c o n n e c t a fiume w i t h a city's canal for purpose ^ P § 5 1
of d i s c h a r g i n g w a t e r into it, u n d e r t h e pTo-i\tMgm
visions of t h i s section and § 7332, is n o t a suit S i l M p
t o condemn l a n d .belonging to the city, and it'^Sjg
is n o t n e c e s s a r y to show, a s provided in § 7333,'<$1§5|
t h a t t h e u s e to ' w h i c h i t is to be applied by : £.
p o w e r company is a more necessary public u s a - § | | |
t h a n t h a t to w h i c h the city devotes i t
(OnV
r e h e a r i n g , 25 XJ. 456; 71 P . 1069.)
g
S a l t L a k e City v. W a t e r & El. P . Co., 2i U , ^
249; 67 P . 672.
^Jgj
P r o p e r t v Is t a k e n for a public use, witluV$&i
t h e provision of t h e constitution declaring tliat'Sjfpr
p r i v a t e p r o p e r t y shall not be t a k e n for publicfj?
u s e w i t h o u t j u s t c o m p e n s a t i o n , ' w h e n the tak-':%
i n g is for u s e t h a t wilt promote t h e p u b l i c ^
interest, a n d will t e n d to develop t h e resources;'^?
of t h e s t a t e . In t h i s case a r i g h t of w a y for£
a n i r r i g a t i o n ditch.
"U
N a s h v. Clark, 27 TJ. 158; 75 P . 371; affirmed i §
198 TJ. S. 361.
'•gly
T h e construction and operation of roads an{Jj|l' ~
t r a m w a y s for t h e development a n d w o r k i n g ^ ,
of m i n e s is a public use.
vvS
H i g h l a n d B . G. M. Co. v. Strlckley, 28 U. 216flj
78 P . 296; affirmed 200 TJ. S. 525.
'r|p
W h e r e a s t r e e t grade w a s established but&.
n o t carried into effect, and thereafter buildings"^
w e r e erected, t h e city w a s liable for damages.^
.resulting from t h e change of grade. The faclj^
t h a t t h e i m p r o v e m e n t s w e r e m a d e before ttyffcafl
a d o p t i o n of Con. a r t . 1, s e c 22, does n o t reyeyipf
liability.
'
' >M'
K i m b a l l v. S. L. City, 32 IT. 253; 90 P . 3 9 5 . ^
H e m p s t e a d v. S. L . City, 32 U . 261; 90-P. 3 f e
F e l t v. S: L . City, 32 TJ. 275-; 90 P . 402.
#M
W e b b e r v. S a l t Lake- City, 40 TJ. 221; 120- : B^~
503
'6-^
L a n n a n v. Waltenspiel, 45 IT. 564; 147 P . 9 0 | i
A proceeding u n d e r § 3467 to obtain ttfie rlgnjjj
to enlarge an Irrigation canal of another^"•controlled b y t h e principles involved in
exercise of t h e r i g h t of eminent domain. ~ s
S. L . City v. E a s t J o r d a n Irr. Co., 40 TJ. l$js
121 P . 593.
'Jm
T h e right to us& a reservoir In common ; .nlp
1
be condemned.
A" '^
Gunnison Irr. Co. v. Gunnison High, o a
Co., 51 U . —; 174 P . 852.
;-&|L
T h e rlgiht t o run w a t e r through defeftdanjii
irrigation canal m a y be condemned, J b . ^ F £ J p i
d e f e n d a n t h a s only a n easement and the org*
ers of t h e l a n d w e r e not p a r t i e s .
^".TT 3 *®
W h i t e r o c k s I r r . Co. v. Mooseman,. 45 Vj'tjjft
141 P . 459.
•
J^IMA p u r c h a s e r of property on a city street.&&M
so with t h e implied consent t h a t the :'£Sf|§L
m u s t be m a d e reasonably safe and c o:n y e n | e g | |
for travel, a n d cannot complain if it is }0Y?qims
or filled to m a k e it safe for travel
BGA?MW
t h e c i t y h a s established t h e grade
f%:0$M
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Lie of the limits b | l
condemnor has thdi
lent, as to-at leastS
:>y persons or cori"
s mill,- smelter, o n
: of said foiir miles;
Dr agreements ex«-;U
hin said limit a n d l
works for the re-%
sed t o restrain the' ; |
ction of ores.
143;'09, p. 50.

i n f o r m him of the extent to which it would
"' be lowered or raised.
.
• Gray v. Salt Lake City, 44 XT. 204; 138 P.
r
1177.
<" * Coal companies may condemn ground for a
I: tipple site, etc., but cannot condemn any por. tion of a right-of-way used for railroad pur• poses; even though a track departs from a
:•• right-of-way, it cannot be approached so close
as to interfere with traffic, and five feet is not
. an unreasonable minimum distance.
Ketchum Coal Co. v. Pleasant "Valley Coal
Co., 50 XJ. —; 168 P. 86.

*

CaL C. Civ. P., § 1239*.

7332. (3590.) Property subject to condemnation. The private property which may be taken under this chapter includes:
1. All real property belonging to any person;
2. Lands belonging* to the state, or to any county, or incorporated city
or town, not appropriated to some public use;
3. Property appropriated to public use; provided, that such property
shall not be taken unless for a more necessary public use than that to which
it has been already appropriated;
4. Franchises for toll roads, toll bridges, ferries, and all other franchises*;
provided, that such franchises shall not be taken unless for free highways,
railroads, or other more necessary public use;
5. All rights of way for any and all purposes mentioned in § 7330, and
any and all structures and improvements thereon, and the lands held or used
in connection therewith, shall be subject to be connected with, crossed, or
intersected by any other right of way or improvement or structure thereon;
they shall also be subject to a limited use in common with the owners thereof,
when necessary; but such uses of crossings, intersections, and connections
shall be made in the manner most compatible with the greatest public benefit
and the least private injury;
6. All classes of private property not enumerated may be taken for public use when such taking is authorized by law. . .

a public use, within
tution declaring that
; be taken for public '-f
ition, when the tak- "A"
promote the public
ievelop the resources
i a right of way for
:; 75 P. 371; affirmed
eratlon of roads and
pment and working
Strlckley, 28 XL 215:
3. 525.
vas established but
thereafter buildings
; liable for damages
of grade. The fact
re made before the
22, does not relieve

CaL C. Civ. P., § 1240*.
Property and franchises of private corporations subject to eminent domain, Con. art. 12,
sec. 11.
Decisions on property subject to condemnation, note to § 7330.
XJnder the provisions of §§7330, 7332, mining'
generally and development of the mines, and
mineral'deposits is a public use, arid where a

TX. 253; 90 P. 395.
32 XJ. 261; 90-P. 397.
275; 90 P . 402.
>M
7, 40 XL 2 2 1 ; 120 P .
XT. 564; 147 P . 908.
to obtain ijhe right
Sinai of another is
is involved in the
linent domain.
Irr. Co., 40 XJ. 126;

mining company has driven a tunnel going
through a claim owned by another company,
and does not, in its own operation, use the
tunnel to its full capacity, the company owning the claim may condemn a right to use the
tunnel jointly to work its claim.
Monataire M. Co. v. Columbus Rexall Con.
M.. Co., 50 XT. —; 174 P. 172.

7333. (3591.) Conditions precedent to condemnation. Before property
can be taken it must appear;
1. That the use to which it is to be applied is a use authorized by law;
2. That the taking is necessary to such use;
3. If already appropriated to some public use, that the public use to
which it is to be applied is a more necessary public use.

)ir In common may
nison High. Canal
firough defendant's
Lemneo, thougn the
nent and the own•ties.
•oseman, 45 XJ. 79;
1 a city street does
it that the street
LIB and convenient
ain if it is lowered
travel so- long as
e grade so as to

Under the provisions of §§ 7330, 7332, mining
generally and development of the mines and
mineral deposits is a public use, and where a
mining company has driven a tunnel going
through a claim owned by another company,
and does not, in its own operation, use the
tunnel to its full capacity, the company owning the claim may condemn a right to use the
tunnel jointly to work its claim.
Monataire M. Co. v. Columbus Rexall Con., 50
XJ. —; 174 P . 172.

7331. (3589.) Estates and rights subject to comdlemaatioa. The following is a classification of the estates and rights in lands subject to be taken
for public u s e :
L A fee simple, when taken for public buildings or grounds,' or for permanent buildings, for reservoirs and dams, and permanent flooding occasioned
thereby;"or for an outlet for a flow,, or a place for the deposit of debris or tailings of a mine, mill, smelter, or other place for the reduction of ores; ^
2. An easement, when taken for any other use;
3. The right of entry upon, and occupation of, lands, and the right 'to
take therefrom such earth, gravel, stones, trees, and timber as may'be necessary for some public use.

ch it will be subjected
engines over a switch
*rty, without proceed: domain.
JES, ETC.:
section and §§ 7332
hnary circumstances
a public use liable to
* public use.
ir & EL P. Co., 24 u.
sr company under ttie
^ o b t a i n the right to
ty s canal for purpose
p it, under the pro1 § 7332, is not a suit
tg to the city, and it
as provided in § 7333(
is to be applied by'
necessary public use
nty devotes i t (On
1069.)
'•
v & El. P'. Co., 24 XJ.
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7334. (3592.) Right to enter to- make survey, etc. Damage. I n all
cases where land is required for public use, the person or corporation, or his
or its agents, in charge of such use may survey and locate the same; but it *
must be located in the manner which will be most compatible with the greatest public good and the least private injury, and subject to the provisions of

m
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this chapter. The person or corporation, or his or its agents, 'in charge of
such public use may enter upon the land and make examinations, surveys, and.
maps thereof, and such entry shall constitute no cause of action in favor of
the owners of the lands, except for injuries resulting from negligence, wantonness, or malice.
Cal.

C. Civ. P., § 1242*.

%
'Sfp
1§§
^j^
:
"'~88$33Si
$8ili8

ip?w>-

!»••

T335. (3593.) Jurisdiction in district coert. Complaiint verified. All
mm
3SS&J:
proceedings under this chapter must be brought in the district court for the
lip'county in which the property or some part thereof is situated. The complaint '$&£$&
mfc
in such cases must be verified.
'-mS8&
•Z&3$t&$0£ &§&}>;
Cal. C. Civ. P., § 1243*.
The provisions of this section are not In conflict with Con. art. 8. sec. 5; providing that all
civil and criminal business arising in any county must be tried in such county, etc., so 'as
to preclude a telegraph company from bringing

an action to condemn a railroad's right of way,
which extends through several counties, for
construction of its lines in one of such counties.
Postal Tel. & C. Co. v. O. S\ L . B. B . Co.,
23 U. 474; 65 P . 735.

•SpS^i.
•i^^^^^S

Ute^.

^^•illPfll^ St8&m&i
Bft&
-\f^ljljj
733©. (3594.) Contents of complaint. The complaint must contain:
^Sf&ipsi
x^ttggligKg
wk~&'--1. The name of the corporation, association, commission, or person in
IPife
-'I^KBi
charge of the public use for which the property is sought, who must be styled
plaintiff;
SSgl**;*';
2. The names of all owners and claimants of the property, if known, or a 4^i||sgjipi^;*
statement that they are unknown, who must be styled defendants ;
warnl l l f e
. 3. A statement of the right of the plaintiff; •
4. If a right of way be sought, the complaint must show the location,, ^SfflilyilalxifSpk
§^%i='
general route, and termini, and must be accompanied with a map thereof, so ^iSPi
S@|33«i.tt''.
^ffjfjSB SSKgrSV
far as the same is involved in the action or proceeding;
illlirf*'
5. A description of each piece of land sought to be taken, and whether M U H
the same includes the whole or only part of an entire parcel or tract. All par- : .tis^SSsB§fi|§??-'
ls£*ift!:
eels lying in the county and required for the same public use may be included -^ffi^^S
in the same or separate proceedings, at the option of the plaintiff, but the
court may consolidate or separate them to suit the convenience of parties.
L*'7??!«H5lifj?P|

m

'llMB

Where a complaint fails to state the attemptCal. C. Civ. P., § 1244*.
ed condemnation proceedings were authorized,
Parties, note to § 7337.
as
required by statute, the defect, being jur- '
Grantors in trust deed to secure indebted- isdictional,
was not waived by a failure to deness are "owners" hereunder.
mur
or object during the trial.
O. S. Xr. By. Co. v. Mitchell, 7 U. 505; 21
Town
of
Tremonton v. Johnston, 49 U. 307:
P. 893.
164 P . 190.
Description of property held sufficient.
Postal Tel. & C. Co. v . 0 . S. L. E. Co., 23
IT. 474; 65 P . 735.
7337. (SSMJ.) AH parties in interest may appear. All persons in occu-

pation of or having or claiming an interest in, any of the property described
in the complaint, or in the damages for the taking thereof, though not named, £p
may appear, plead, arid defend, each in respect to his own property or in- $ | 1 |
tefest, or that claimed by him, in like manner as if named in the complaint. ^
Cal. C. Civ. P., § 1246.
The giving of a trust deed merely creates a
lien upon the premises, and a decree against
the trustee would give no right of entry as
against the equitable owner.
O. S. Ii. By. Co. v. Mitchell, 7'U. 505; 27
P. 693.
The fact that a telegraph company of another state is interested in a corporation organized under the laws of Utah to construct
a telegraph line does not affect the latter's
right to maintain proceedings to condemn a
right of way for construction of its lineB.
Postal Tel. & C. Co. v. O. S. L . B . B .
Co., 23 U. 474; 65 P . 735.
It is not necessary that the complaint in
condemnation proceedings make all the owners or alleged owners parties; but one in possession and claiming ownership must be
joined.
Brigham City v. Chase, 30 TJ. 410; 85 P . 436.

A holder of a certificate tax sale may bemade a party.
O. S.- It. B. BJ. Co. v . Halloct, 41 TJ. 378; i
126 P . 394.
"Where condemnation proceedings are instl-*^^
tuted against the person in possession of land.-^-^
under contract to purchase from the state ,£*;
the title to ,which is in the United States Gov-'&Hm
eminent, subsequently, pending the proceed-^Ag^lp
ings, the defendant in possession assigned his^r
right in the land to a corporation, of which 3 ^
he was president, which received a patent ;§gg.
therefor from the state and was afterward^"-^a
made a party to the proceedings, held the^sgp
original defendant had an interest in the laJid^^/^pf
when the proceedings were commenced wWch;#|||3
was subject to condemnation and was the sam'e.^gfe3
interest which passed to the defendant corpo-;^^
ration and ripened into a title relating back :to/^gg
the contract sale by the state.
'Ms
n
Brigham
City
- -—• v. Bich,
- - - 34 U. 130;
— 97 P . 220.
?0.^^

J338. (3596.) Power of the co^art. The court or judge thereof s h a U j | |
have power:
J^fe
1. To determine the conditions specified in § 7333; to determine t h ? ^ ^
places of making connections and crossings, and to regulate the manner t h e r e | g
of and of enjoying the common use mentioned in sub. 5, § 7332;
'*'
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in charge of
surveys, and
1 in favor of
igence, wanirerifiedl. All
:ourt for the
be complaint
.'s right of way,
il counties, for
if such counties.
L. B. R. Co.,

: contain:
Dr person in
ist be styled
known, or a
:he location,.
> thereof, so
md whether
ct. All parbe included
tiff, but the
f parties.
te the attemptere authorized,
ect, heing juri failure to de« •
:on, 49 U. 307; .

)erty or in- ' : ^

ermine t h | |
nner t h e r p g

IFW:

2. To hear and determine all adverse or conflicting claims to the property sought to be condemned, and to the damages therefor;
3. To determine the respective rights of different parties seeking condemnation of the same property.
i'7.
sir *

Gal. C. Civ. P., § 1247*.
Where it is alleged that the defendant company claimed to own part of the property
sought to he condemned, and such company,
in its answer, claimed title to such land, and
the plaintiff, in its reply, alleged that, since
the commencement of the action, it had ac-

quired title to the land in question and denied
the defendant's tax title, held the district court
was authorized to determine these issues in
the same action.
Ketchum Coal Co. v. District Court, 48 IT.
342; 159 P . 737.

. 7339. (3597.) Occupancy of premises pemdrng actios*. Notice. Hear- %SS J
ing. Bond Restraining order. The plaintiff may move the court or a judge (jfo
thereof, at any time after the commencement of suit, on notice to the defendant, if he. is a resident of the county, or has appeared in the action,* otherwise
by serving a notice directed to him on the clerk of the courtjfof an. order
permitting the plaintiff to occupy the premises sought to be condemned, pending the action, and to do such work thereon as may be required for the easement sought, according to its nature. The court or a judge thereof shall take
proof by affidavit or otherwise, of the value of the premises, sought to be condemned and of the damages which will accrue from the condemnation, and
of the reasons for requiring a speedy occupation, and shall grant or refuse
the motion according to the equity of the case and the relative damages which
may accrue to the parties. If the motion is granted, the court or judge shall
require the plaintiff to execute and file in court a bond to the defendant, with
sureties to be approved by the court or judge, in a penal sum to be fixed by
the court or judge, not less than double the value of the premises sought to be
condemned and the damages which will ensue from condemnation, as the
same may appear to the court or judge on the hearing, and conditioned to
pay the adjudged value of the premises and all damages in case the property
is condemned, and to pay all damages arising from occupation before judgment in case the premises are not condemned, and all costs adjudged to the
defendant in the action. The sureties shall justify before the court or judge
after a reasonable notice to the defendant of the time and place of justification. The amounts fixed shall be for the purposes of the motion only, and
I?;.- shall not be admissible in evidence' on final hearing. The court or judge may
also, pending the action, restrain the defendant from hindering or interfering
vyith the occupation of the premises and the doing thereon of the work required for the easement. •
Bight of plaintiS to enter into possession of
property in condemnation proceeding's, upon
filing- sufficient bond, upheld, and provisions
of this section declared not in conflict with
Con. a r t 1, sec. 22.
.. S; 1/. C. Water Co. v. S. L . C. et al.f 24
TJ. 2S2; 67 P. 791.
.;;.•• The mere fact tuat a person contemplates
having* certain land condemned for public use
ggjjfc-giveS him no right of entry prior to condemnar
&f?tioB, and condemnation cannot he had by way
jK.of counterclaim in action brought to restrain
$g>.a trespass and for damages.
%jj£.. Peterson v. Bean, 22 TJ. 43; 61 P . 213.

That condemnation was for a public use is
settled by the. lower court's order of condemnation authorizing- plaintiff to take possession
of and improve the land.
Ketchum Coal Co. v. District Court, 48 TJ.
342; 159 P . 737.
A stipulation by a landowner's counsel that
the court might enter an order ior occupancy,
agreeing- to the amount of the bond, and stipulating that the road's counsel have time to
answer, constitutes a- general appearance.
Ogden L. & I. By. Co., v. Jones, 50 TJ .—;
168 P . 54B.

7340.- (3598.) Bamr»ages,
assessed. The
Damsages., hew
Jtaw assessed,
i n e court, jury, commissionJlers, or referee must hear such legal testimony as may be offered by any of
'^#^ e parties to the proceedings, and thereupon must ascertain and assess:
1. The value of the property sought to be condemned and all improvem e n t s thereon pertaining to the realty, and of each and every separate estate
Wtinterest therein; if it consist of different parcels, the value of each parcel
gJmd of each estate or interest therein shall be separately assessed;
2. If the property sought to be condemned constitutes only a part of a
J l J £ e P a r c el, the damages which will accrue to the portion not sought to be
Ippdemned, by reason of its severance from the portion sought to be conIfettined, and the construction of the improvement in the manner proposed by
l ! f Plaintiff;
£3. If the property, though no part thereof is taken, will be damaged by
^•9 ns truction of the proposed improvement, the amount of such damages;
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itfip^'
;

'^ipjlHSlippy: *

!SfiS& *
4. Separately, how much the portion not sought to be condemned, and •j)£jiilH
'^'cjx&isiiif
£j-«|Sf|l§j
W3m£'1:'
each estate or interest therein, will be benefited, if at all, by the construction
of the improvement proposed by the plaintiff; and if the benefit shall be equal "^ifiS• P N '
WW- de
to the damages assessed, under sub. 2 of this section, the owner of the parcel *§
va
?>Wimm
shall be allowed no compensation except the value of the portion taken; but •^'sllPilli SHIN a c
BPt
if the benefit shall be less than the damages so assessed, the former shall be '^T^JStJj
} n
WP^
' *m
deducted from the latter, and the remainder shall be the only damages allowed
WSm'--'
in addition to the value of the portion taken;
Sp§-#se
5. If the property sought to be condemned be for a railroad, the cost of
p^ip?- o l
good and sufficient fences along the line of such railroad between such railroad' • S t ^ ^ ^ ^ f e §§§&£ (
$p||||p
and .other adjoining lands of the defendant; and the cost of cattle guards •$gffm
ll^lf-'.tri
/jK*j§igpb llsPSfe se:
where fences may cross the line of such railroad;
th
-•vsgBS
Bjjgfr
da
6. As far as practicable, compensation must be assessed for each source
IBS©!?:
•iSli I P I P ^ . - ' ssue
of damages separately.
•"^•1j f g ^ | £
S£§S§MM
the old line set off against the damage done
Cal. CVCiv. P., § 1248*.

-jiiiP • p i p

Private property shall not be taken or dam- the land adjoining the new line.
aged for public use without just compensation,
O. S. L. R. Co. v. Pox, 28 U. 311; 78 P . 800. i.ijSsgiglljg^
Con. a r t 1, sec. 22.
After defendant, In a former and present '%plll
submitted all its evidence on the
MEASURE OF D A M A G E S FOR CONDEM- trial, had
that condemnor would exclude it from :
NATION FOR USE FOR RAILROAD PUR- theory
the
tracks,
the condemnor had no right to
POSES:
amend, as a matter of course, so as to per- -'•^Spiiij j!|j§K&;.p
mit
defendant
to hava joint possession of the
Of land used for school, purposes, is the dimi
lllliisa**?- •
nution of the value of the property when used part of the track, and an order imposing as a
condition
of
the
amendment that" condemnor
for school purposes determined as of the date
r
of the operation of the railroad, and interest pay the defendant $1750 was proper.
Bingham & Garfield Ry. Co. v. North Utah ,;
should be avowed from such date.
.«WiS§eigis
S. P. f L. A. & S. JJ.IL Co. v. Board of Edu- Mining Co., 162 P . 65. •
cation, 35 U. 13; 99 P . 263.
COMPENSATION FOR PROPERTY TAKEN
Evidence Insufficient to show that the propa
im&m
erty had been wholly destroyed for school FOR OTHER PUBLIC PURPOSES:
Where
land taken in good faith for the erec- >W0&$8js
purposes.
•»S &f ' F
S. P., L. A. & S. L. R Co. v. Board of Educa- tion of a schoolhouse, the owner not being
known, but with intention to acquire title by
tion, 32 TJ. 305; 90 P . 565.
A railroad In the street In front of property proceedings in eminent domain, if he should
—the depreciation in the market value of the not consent to such use of it, he cannot recover as damages the value of such school- •. : ^sfiili
'Jj&fe|pi5!i&
property.
•f^^^^^t wS&j?':
Morris v. O. S. L. E. Co., 36 U. 14; 102 P . house.
•^•Ssa||g|p
629.
Chase v. Jemmett, 8 U. 231; 30 P . 757.
Where a telegraph company condemns a ' ^•"^^rfiiillgMmsj&fir
Where a railroad was built over unoccupied
r
public land to which a party afterwards ac- right of way along the right of way for a railquires title, the value of the railroad's im- road, the damages are nominal, since the tele- ,v;v-i&5?=5g|gg
graph company does not materially interfere
provements are not an element of damages.
D. & R. G. W. By. Co. v. Stancliff, 4 IT. 117; with the use of the land for railroad purposes. •^•^sfESFES? Wssms1
Postal Tel. Co. v. O. S. L. R. Co., 23 U. 474:
7 P . 530.
The castfng of cinders on and the emission 65 P . 735.
In* an action for damages to real estate by
of engine smoke over land abutting a railroad
t&g&^&'f-1
cannot be considered by the jury in a suit hy reason of the construction of a viaduct, where ':&JM55S5M
,r
witness
testified as to the depreciation, of the \\$l$Sm
SsgB^fe*
the owner as a separate and distinct element
W
l
8
8
l
property, evidence that the viaduct tended to ^ ^ J H l l p l p lslg&s£F^*- 1
of damage.
improve
the
property
generally
•
on
the
street,
•WsTj^SeSafii
Jordan v. Utah R. R. Co., 47 U. 519; 156 and made more business thereon, is not admislllilfe-?
P. 939.
;&m§m lWsBS^'*'
Where Interference wltth Ingress and egress sible, where it is not shown that the particuto abutting land, railroad is liable for grading* lar property is benefited.
Cook v. Salt Lake City, 48 U. 5S; 157 P .
the street in front of the premises.
643.
Id.
In proceedings to condemn a strip of land ,
The rental value of the land to be condemned
which to erect poles bearing wires heavily
for the year preceding- the one in. which the on
charged
electricity, if the presence of
action is commenced is some evidence of value. the wireswith
expose persons and livestockOgden L. & I . Ry. Co. v. Jones, 50 U. —; on the landwould
of
defendant to danger, and thus
168 P . 548.
depreciate
the
market
of such land, de- •
Increased Insurance rate for property in fendant was entitled tovalue
show such fact
proximity of the railroad.
Telluride
Power
Co.
v.
Bruneau,
41 U. 501;
O'Neill v, S. P . , L . A. & S. L . R. Co., 38 125 P. 399.
U. 475; 114 P . 127.
In
an
action
to
condemn
land
for
canal
purDamages to plaintiff's property by j a r of poses, the damages recoverable by land owner
<
passing trains, and from, smoke and cinders, may
include
damages
by
seepage
to
adjoining
where the construction and operation of the land and for the land within the highway to •
railroad is careful and proper, but cannot in- which the plaintiff owned the fee.
clude damages for negligent operation.
Utah Lake Irr. Co. v. Jensen, 49 U. 19; 161 .
P. 677. •
Id.
Eliciting from the owner on cross-exam In a- •
General benefits by the establishment of the
railroad cannot be deducted from damages to tlon that fifteen years prior he had stated the f
owner whose land was taken for right of way. value much less than he testified their value..,:ii
S. L . & IT. R. Co. v . Butterfield, 46 TJ. 431; to be a t the trial was improper, as being too^gp
remote, but harmless as to substantial rights. :jr"
150 P . 9'31.
Town' of Tremonton v. Johnston, 49 U. 307;-^
To compensation In money and may not be
• ?%l
required to accept any mitigation of damages 164 P. 190.
Where property such as a mining tunnel is'£$$
or condemnee's offer of a joint possession or
occupancy subordinate to the condemnor's use. condemned for the- purpose of a joint use, the; "
B. & G. Ry. Co. v. North Utah M. Co., 49 whole matter of determining what is a reason- iyc _,.
able compensation as well as the regulations a$pgj
U. 125; 162 P . 65.
Where a railroad company, on constructing respecting the use of the property is deter-^Jgf^
mined
and regulated according to the rules oZ$M
a line across a land owner's premises, aband" .^r7^
oned an old line across the same premises a equity.
mile distant, the company was not entitled
Monataire M. Co. v. Columbus Rexall Con>M
to have any benefit from the abandonment of M.. Co., 50 U. —; 174 P . 172. .
.
' . vgg

'MBm

Bfe-' p

lllP

lll^
lllP"

llfiSlj• K ' l
fijpfl'.t
v

iBSI i
•K'-t

•ft'
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Nfcrth U t a h
}TY T A K E N
Tor t h e erecr n o t being"
aire title by
* h e should
cannot reu c h school- .
D P . 757.
or n d e m n s a
for a railce t h e tele!y interfere
d purposes.
23 XI.

474;

I e s t a t e by
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tion of t h e
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ie p a r t i c u -

P of land
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esence of
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and thus
land, dest.
1 IT. 50.1;
a n a ! purna owner
adjoiningj h w a y to

U n d e r provisions of t h i s section and §§ 73437346, d e f e n d a n t s in a condemnation proceeding'
were not entitled to i n t e r e s t upon the assessm e n t of compensation from t h e date of t h e
service of s u m m o n s ; d e f e n d a n t s r e m a i n i n g i n
possession.
O. S. L . H. K. Co. v. Jones, 29 TJ. 147; 80 P .
732.
S. L . City W a t e r Co. v. S. L . City, 24 TJ. 282;
67 P . 791.

staminaated the
sir value
eing- too *
-1 r i g h t s .
TJ. 307;

-m

m
w

7342. (3600.) Action begun anew where defendant's title defective. If
J P the title attempted to be acquired is found to be defective from any cause, the
p | \ plaintiff may again institute proceedings to acquire the same as in this chapter
*': prescribed.
'
.
.
.• Cal. C. Civ. P . , § 1250.

7343. (3601.) Damages to he paid within thirty days. Bond for railroad fence. The plaintiff must, within thirty days after final judgment, pay
the sum of money assessed; and, if the plaintiff is a railroad company, it shall
• also execute to the defendant a bqnd, with sureties, to be determined and approved by the court or judge, conditioned that the plaintiff shall build proper
fences within six months from the time the railroad is built on or over the
land taken. In an action on the bond, all damages sustained and the cost of
the construction of such fences may be recovered.
'Cal. C. Civ. P . , § 1251*.

7344. (3602.) Id. To whom paid. Execution if not paid. Annulling
proceedings. Payment may be made to the defendants entitled thereto, or
the money may be deposited in court for the defendants and be distributed
to those entitled thereto. If the money be not so paid or deposited, the defendants may have execution as in civil cases; and if the money cannot be
made on execution, the court, upon a showing to that effect, must set aside
. and annul the entire proceedings, and restore possession of the property to
the defendants if possession has been taken by the plaintiff.
Cal. C. Civ. P . , § 1252.

Cal. C. Civ. P . , § 1253.

r. 19; 161

J] Con.

Cal. C. Civ. P . , § 1249*.
W h e r e condemnation s u i t is b r o u g h t a g a i n s t
- J ? ' trustee u n d e r a t r u s t deed, and s u m m o n s
irari & ' / s e r v e d upon him, a n d t h e equitable owner
®/' thereafter voluntarily e n t e r s his appearance,
^ ^ f l a m a g e s a r e to be assessed a s of the d a t e of
s&such e n t r y of a p p e a r a n c e , n o t t h e d a t e of
^'.service of s u m m o n s upon t r u s t e e .
£
O. S. L . By. Co. v. Mitchell, 7 TJ. 505; 27
§&'P. 693.

7345. (3603.) Final order made inpon payment. Recording same.
-When payments have been made (and the bond given, if the plaintiff elects
to give one), as required by the next two preceding sections, the court must
make a final order of condemnation, which must describe the property condemned and the purpose of such condemnation. A copy of the order must be
filed in the office of the recorder of the county, and thereupon the property
described therein shall vest in the plaintiff for the purpose therein specified.

»8; 157 P .

unnef IB
use, t h e
reasonulations
s deterrules of

ll

7341. (3599.) Damages deemed accrued at date of service. For the
Stirpose of assessing compensation and damages, the right thereto shall be
ffleemed to have accrued at the date of the service of summons, and its actual
jfealue at that date shall be the measure of compensation for all property to be
factually taken, and the basis of damages to property not actually taken, but
^injuriously affected, in all cases where such damages are allowed, as provided
fen the next preceding section. No improvements put upon the property subg*sequent to the date of service of summons shall be included in the assessment
jl^bf compensation or damages.

•

'

7346. (3604.) Authorising occupancy by plaintiff. Deposit. Payment.
Effect. At any time after-the entry of judgment, or pending an appeal from
the judgment to the supreme court, whenever the plaintiff shall have paid
• into court for the defendant the full amount of the judgment, and such further
sum as^ may be required by the court as a fund to pay any further damages
' and -ca^fe-tliat may be recovered in said proceedings'^ as well as all damages
that may be sustained by the defendant, if for any cause the property shall
not be finally taken for public use, the district court in which the proceeding
was tried may, upon notice of not less than ten days, authorize the plaintiff,
if already in possession, to continue therein, and if not, then to take posses;. sion of and use the property during the pendency of and until the final conclusion of the litigation, and may, if necessary, stay all actions and proceed-.
. ings against the plaintiff on account thereof. The defendant, who is entitled
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to the money paid into court for him upon any judgment, shall be entitled to\t§l§|
demand and receive the same at any time thereafter upon obtaining an order.tjSf
therefor from the court. It shall be the duty of the court or a judge thereof T
upon application being made by such defendant, to order and direct that the *
money so paid into court for him be delivered to him upon his filing a satis-*:
faction of the judgment, or upon his filing a receipt therefor, and an abandon-1
ment of all defenses to the action or proceeding, except as to the amount of:
damages .that he may be entitled to in the &Ytut that a new trial shall be;
granted A payment to a defendant, as aforesaid, shall be held to be an •'
abandonment by such defendant of all defenses interposed by him, excepting.':
his claim for greater compensation;
• •
•;
Gal. C. Civ. P., § 1254*.

,

•

' ;

7347. (3605.) Apportionment of costs. Costs may be allowed or not/H
and if allowed, may be apportioned between the parties on the same or ad- ""
verse sides, in the discretion of the court.
•:
Cal. C. Civ. P., § 1255.
Costs Generally, §§ 7035-7054.

•

.

T h i s section Includes only such costs as a r e ' ? P
taxable under the statute.
,t$f
McCready v. R- G. W. By. Co., 30 17. 1: 83 '%M
P . 331.
.
g

7348- (3606.) Procedure applicable. Except as otherwise provided in l i p
this chapter, the provisions of this code relative jto civil actions, new trials, W§
and appeals shall be applicable to and constitute the rules of practice in t h e | | l !
proceedings in this chapter.
3^8
Cal. C. Civ. P., § 1256*.

7349. (3607.) Rights of cities and towns' not affected. Nothing in this;
code must be construed to abrogate or repeal any statute providing for thejf§
taking of property in any city or town for street purposes.
M,
Cal. a Civ. P., § 1263.

*Jj|l

7350. (3608.) Crossings t o be made and' kept in repair. A party ob-iiiSF
taining a right of way shall, without delay, construct such crossings as may J i t
be required by the court or judge, and shall keep them and the way itself in^jfgood repair.
-VSI

CHAPTER 66.
QUO WARRANTO.
7354. (3609.) Actioni in name of state, against wno-m. A civil action!
may be brought in the name of the state:
1. Against a person who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds o r | p
exercises^a public office, civil or military, or a franchise, within this state. of|f|
an office in a corporation^created by the authority of this state;
'*""*
2. Against a public officer, civil or military, who does or suffers an acfif
which, by the provisions of law, works a forfeiture of his office;
.$&'
3. Against an association of persons who act as a corporation withing
this state without being legally incorporated.
'"
Mont. Civ. P . , § 1410.
Cal. C. Civ. P . , § 803*.
Original jurisdiction in s u p r e m e a n d in d i s t r i c t courts, Con. art* 8, sees. 4, 7.
T h e w r i t of quo w a r r a n t o will n o t issue a n d
c a n n o t be invoked for purpose of determiningmerely a p r i v a t e r i g h t i n w h i c h t h e public is
n o t interested.
Cupit v. Parte City Bank, 20 TJ. 292; 58 P .
839.
T h e a t t o r n e y - g e n era! m u s t bring- t h e a c t i o n
in the n a m e of t h e s t a t e on his own r e l a t i o n

or on leave of court on relation of a n o t h e r , : - ^ _
except t h a t one claiming to be entitled to p u b s $ g | |
lie office unlawfully exercised b y another mays-gT^3
b r i n g action i n t h e n a m e of t h e s t a t e ; u n d e r , ^
s u c h c i r c u m s t a n c e s he alone m a y control thejL 5
action.
"^a?®
Murdoch T. Ryan, 41 IT. 327; 125' P. 666.
tyg
A citizen a n d resident t a x p a y e r cannot s u f ? | | |
in t h e n a m e of t h e s t a t e to t e s t validity of thai
organization of a high school district; ti?B3
s t a t e alone m a y do so.
Id.

7355. (3610.) Id. Agaiost a corporation. A like action may
brought against a corporation:
• ^%m
1. When it has offended against a provision of an act by or under wHi£^
.it was created, altered, or renewed, or any act altering or amending s u c ^.-;i|^8
2. When it has forfeited its privileges and franchises by n o n u s e f ^ ^ ^ J
•••
• .$&$
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